Why did Qatar leave the Djibouti-Eritrea border?

The renewed Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute is the first ripple effect of the Gulf crisis in Africa.

Maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari armed troops in a remote area was a costly and largely thankless endeavour write Barakat and Milton [AP]
Maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari armed troops in a remote area was a costly and largely thankless endeavour write Barakat and Milton [AP]

by 

@BARAKAT_Sultan

Sultan Barakat is the director of Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute.

by 

@SansomMilton

Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

The media has been quick to associate Qatar’s decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the disputed Djibouti-Eritrea border with the Gulf crisis. This connection was most likely made because Qatar’s decision came only days after both Djibouti and Eritrea announced that they are siding with Saudi Arabia in the diplomatic rift and downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar.

The withdrawal of troops, if understood as a knee-jerk reaction, contrasts markedly with how Qatar has been operating since the start of the crisis. Qatar has not reciprocated the harsh, punitive moves of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in a tit-for-tat spiral of vindictiveness. Nor has it reacted to countries which have reduced diplomatic relations, such as Jordan, by taking retaliatory measures against its thousands of nationals working in Qatar.

While Qatar Airways offices have been sealed off in Abu Dhabi and its senior staff harassed, no such measures have been taken by Doha. Furthermore, while food supplies through Saudi Arabia and the UAE were cut, Qatar continues to supply the latter with around 57 million cubic metres of gas daily. This shows that Qatar continues to play the long game by taking the moral high ground – a strategy that looks to have paid off given the number of international diplomatic capitals that have refused to cave into the intense lobbying of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to vilify Qatar. 

READ MORE: Africa and the Gulf crisis: the peril of picking sides

Given what we know about how Qatar has operated during the crisis, the explanation that the troop withdrawal is purely a knee-jerk reaction to the downgrading of diplomatic ties does not add up. Doubtlessly, with downgraded relations, Qatar finds itself in a difficult position as a mediator and peacekeeper between the two nations. No mediator can operate effectively with reduced representation, both on a practical and reputational level. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the decision has been made in a retaliatory manner. Rather, there are three less evident reasons for why the decision to withdraw has been on the cards for some time and why it is now impossible for anyone in Qatar to advocate for maintaining the peacekeeping force.

The potential fallout of the crisis could have ripple waves spiralling out of the border dispute to the much larger Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict and the rest of the Horn of Africa at a time when the sub-region is facing a massive humanitarian crisis.

First of all, a fundamental principle of conflict mediation is that any third party must maintain a credible threat to walk away if the conflicting parties are not committed to reaching a negotiated settlement. Qatari troops have, for the past seven years, been stationed in the dusty uninhabited border region between the two East African countries to monitor the implementation of the terms of a ceasefire agreement brokered by Qatar in June 2010.

Despite consistent attempts to turn the ceasefire into a peace agreement, little progress has been made. A minor breakthrough was achieved in March 2016 when, in a deal mediated by Qatar, Eritrea released four prisoners from Djibouti’s armed forces who were captured in June 2008 during border clashes. However, in the past year, the Eritrean negotiating team has disengaged from the mediation process despite the United Nations Security Council mandated-arms embargo on Eritrea being re-approved in November 2016, demanding that Eritrea release all missing prisoners and allow UN monitors to enter the country.

The two states, particularly Eritrea, have not heeded calls for border demarcation and have gone into denial by refusing to refer to the border conflict as a serious issue. The presence of the Qatari peacekeepers had allowed both parties to grow accustomed to the status quo of a mutually beneficial stalemate.

Second, Djibouti and Eritrea consistently engage in a geostrategic game of shifting alliances. When Qatar entered the fray, the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute was a minor conflict with very few international actors showing an appetite for mediation. Since then Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti has expanded to become the largest US military base in the region, China has also entered Djibouti, while, in April 2015, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea signed a security cooperation agreement and the UAE is currently completing the construction of a military base north of the port city of Assab in Eritrea from where its armed forces have been operating in the military campaign in Yemen. This particular corner of the Horn of Africa is by now far too crowded for a small nation like Qatar to justify its military presence as a buffer.

READ MORE: Qatar-Gulf crisis: All the latest updates

Third, maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari troops in a remote area is a costly and largely thankless endeavour. While the withdrawal was doubtlessly hastened by the changes in diplomatic relations with Eritrea and Djibouti, this has more to do with the infiltration of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia into Eritrea. This military presence clearly renders Qatari troops stationed thousands of miles away in an isolated area a soft target for direct or indirect retaliation. Moreover, 500 troops represent a significant investment of military manpower for an armed forces of around 12,000 during the most urgent crisis the country has faced in its history.

With Eritrea moving its forces into the contested Dumeira Mountain and Dumeira Islands, the temperature of the conflict has been increased and the situation is now more explosive than ever before, for all actors involved. The rapid development of the situation demonstrates the important stabilising role that Qatar had played under the radar for many years.

Moreover, the potential fallout of the crisis could have ripple waves spiralling out of the border dispute to the much larger Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict and the rest of the Horn of Africa at a time when the sub-region is facing a massive humanitarian crisis. This should serve as a cautionary note for the potential of escalation in other places where Qatari assistance has been keeping the lid on conflict, in particular, the Gaza Strip, where as a result of the increased isolation of Qatar by its Gulf neighbours we may see the end of the single most important donor to the reconstruction of the besieged territory to date. This should focus the minds of world leaders on the need to resolve the Gulf crisis amicably as soon as possible.

Professor Sultan Barakat is the director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and professor in the Department of Politics at the University of York.

Dr Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

China sends troops to Djibouti, establishes first overseas military base

By Brad Lendon and Steve George, CNN

Story highlights

  • “This base can support Chinese Navy to go farther,” Chinese paper says
  • Djibouti has become host to several foreign military powers

(CNN)China has dispatched troops to Djibouti in advance of formally establishing the country’s first overseas military base.

Two Chinese Navy warships left the port of Zhanjiang on Tuesday, taking an undisclosed number of military personnel on the journey across the Indian Ocean.
An editorial Wednesday in the state-run Global Times stressed the importance of the new Djibouti facility — in the strategically located Horn of Africa — to the Chinese military.
“Certainly this is the People’s Liberation Army’s first overseas base and we will base troops there. It’s not a commercial resupply point… This base can support Chinese Navy to go farther, so it means a lot,” said the paper.
The Global Times said the main role of the base would be to support Chinese warships operating in the region in anti-piracy and humanitarian operations.
“It’s not about seeking to control the world,” said the editorial.
Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy troops march in Djibouti's independence day parade on June 27, marking 40 years since the end of French rule in the Horn of Africa country.

Chinese military presence

At a regular press briefing Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang described the base as part of ongoing efforts to help bring peace and security to the region.
“China has been deploying naval ships to waters off Somalia in the Gulf of Aden to conduct escorting missions since 2008,” said Geng. “The completion and operation of the base will help China better fulfill its international obligations in conducting escorting missions and humanitarian assistance … It will also help promote economic and social development in Djibouti.”
China has expanded its military ties across Africa in recent years. According to a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), cooperation with Africa on peace and security is now an “explicit part of Beijing’s foreign policy.”
In 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping committed 8,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping standby force — one fifth of the 40,000 total troops committed by 50 nations — China also pledged $100 million to the African Union standby force and $1 billion to establish the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.
More than 2,500 Chinese combat-ready soldiers and police officers are now deployed in blue-helmet missions across the African continent, with the largest deployments in South Sudan (1,051), Liberia (666), and Mali (402), according to the ECFR.
“Blue-helmet deployments give the PLA a chance to build up field experience abroad — and to help secure Chinese economic interests in places such as South Sudan,” said the ECFR report.
Africa is home to an estimated one million Chinese nationals, with many employed in infrastructure projects backed by the Chinese government.
“China’s involvement in African security is a product of a wider transformation of China’s national defense policy. It is taking on a global outlook … and incorporating new concepts such as the protection of overseas interests and open seas protection,” said the report.

US ‘strategic interests’

China joins the US, France and Japan, among others, with permanent bases in Djibouti, a former French colony with a population of less than one million residents.
Though small in both population and size, Djibouti’s position on the tip of the Horn of Africa offers strategic access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The strait, which is only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, connects the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean beyond.
One of the world’s most important sea lanes, millions of barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait daily, according to GlobalSecurity.org.
US Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, stressed Djibouti’s location during a visit to the US Camp Lemonnier garrison there earlier this year.
“This particular piece of geography is very, very important to our strategic interests,” Waldhauser said in joint appearance with US Defense Secretary James Mattis.
The US military has some 4,000 troops at Camp Lemonnier, a 100-acre base for which it signed a 10-year, $630 million lease in 2014, according to media reports.
Elsewhere in Djibouti, the US military operates the Chabelley Airfield, from which the Pentagon stages drone airstrikes, likely into Somalia and across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into Yemen, according to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College in New York. The Pentagon is investing millions in the base, and satellite photos show several construction projects, the center reported last year.
US Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys prepare to land at a landing zone during training conducted in Djibouti on January 10.

‘Get-rich-quick scheme’

Japan, which has seen tense relations with China over disputed islands in the East China Sea, has established what it calls an “activity facility” to support its anti-piracy efforts there.
A spokesperson for the Japan Self Defense Forces said 170 troops are at its 30-acre facility in Djibouti.
Lease terms would not be released, but Japan will spend about $9 million to operate the facility this fiscal year, the spokesperson said.
Edward Paice, director of the London-based Africa Research Institute, said a base in Djibouti makes a lot of sense for China, just as it does for Japan or the US.
“It (China) has cited its desire to play a greater role in peacekeeping, and it has combat troops in both South Sudan and Mali. It’s logical that it needs an actual base somewhere in Africa, which is really no different from the Americans saying that they need Camp Lemonnier as a headquarters for operations in Africa, whether in peacekeeping or counterterror or whatever,” Paice said on The Cipher Brief website.
Picture taken on May 5, 2015, shows work in progress on the new railway tracks linking Djibouti with Addis Ababa.
Paice points out that China made a substantial investment in Djibouti — about $500 million, according to reports — to build the Djibouti portion of a rail line to the capital of neighboring Ethiopia.
“It’s a confluence of these factors — trade, military, and stability in the host country’s government” that brought China to Djibouti, Paice said.
Meanwhile, for Djibouti, it’s all about money, Paice said. “This is a fantastic get-rich-quick scheme — to rent bits of desert to foreign powers. It’s as simple as that.”

Teddy Afro: ‘Because of our government, our country is divided’

The Guardian

The musician’s latest album, with songs hailing Ethiopia’s glorious past, is the fastest-selling record in the country’s history. But his political views have made him enemies at home

Teddy Afro … somewhat unintentionally, a flag-waver for the Ethiopian opposition.
 Teddy Afro … somewhat unintentionally, a flag-waver for the Ethiopian opposition. Photograph: Mulugeta Ayene/AP

Tewodros Kassahun’s manager meets me on a quiet suburban road inside a gated compound. With their neoclassical mansions, manicured lawns and white picket fences, compounds such as this are a rarity in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and this one is as grand as it gets. Still, I’m underwhelmed as we turn in to the driveway of the house, which, by contrast with its neighbours, is relatively modest. This is, after all, the home of the biggest star in Ethiopian musical history: Teddy Afro.

He greets me in the living room, padding around in a tracksuit and socks. The house is in a bit of a mess, and he apologises – they’re clearing up the remains of an album launch party over the weekend. He and his manager are in high spirits. Three days earlier, they released Ethiopia, his fifth studio album; it had a record $650,000 recording budget, was the fastest-selling record in the country’s history, and topped Billboard’s world albums chart. Teddy’s relief is palpable – the release was beset by delays – as he settles into a chair and begins outlining his philosophy. “Art is closer to magic than logic,” he says, beaming cheerfully.

It is difficult to overstate Teddy Afro’s popularity and importance in Ethiopia today. “His level of celebrity is simply unprecedented,” says Heruy Arefe-Aine, the organiser of the country’s Ethiopian Music festival.

Teddy Afro – Ethiopia

Ethiopia has long had a remarkably unified pop music culture – a national canon heard on buses and in bars across the country – but even in this context, Teddy stands out. He is the only artist of his generation to have risen to the level of Mahmoud Ahmed and Aster Aweke, the two greats of post-1960 Ethiopian pop, but at home at least he has comfortably outrun them both. Moreover, his significance reaches well beyond national borders: his popularity among the 2-million-strong Ethiopian diaspora, especially in the US, is unparalleled. The Ethio-Canadian R&B singer the Weeknd has cited him as a major influence.

But he is also a controversial figure. In 2008, he was imprisoned for a hit-and-run offence, which he has always denied he was responsible for. Many regard the jail sentence as a politically motivated move by Ethiopia’s authoritarian government, and a reaction to his 2005 album Yasteseryal, released in the year of a hotly disputed election. The lead single, whose video featured archive footage of the former emperor Haile Selassie and the bloody revolution that followed his reign, was interpreted by many as an indictment of everything that followed the emperor’s demise, including the current regime.

He became, perhaps somewhat unintentionally, a flag-waver for the Ethiopian opposition, a reputation he has maintained. The song is still, for all practical purposes, banned.

He makes for an unlikely political radical, and indeed his manager makes clear from the outset that politics is off the agenda. But he is nonetheless keen to explain the new album’s message. Lyrics are everything in Ethiopian music, and his – rich in idiom, allusion and wordplay – have excited his fans ever since he broke on to the scene in the early 00s. He argues that the country, under a state of emergency after violent anti-government protests last year, is slipping backwards. “We used to be a model for Africa,” he says, “but, because of our government, our country is divided.” The album is a call for unity and the rehabilitation of Ethiopia’s glorious past. “This younger generation is in a dilemma about their history,” he continues. “I feel a responsibility to teach them about the good things from their history. They should be proud of their achievements.”

Teddy Afro on stage in New York.
 Teddy Afro on stage in New York. Photograph: Jack Vartoogian/Getty Images

Glancing references to the government aside, this is fairly inoffensive stuff. But in fact the politics are tricky. At the centre of the album is the story of Emperor Tewodros II, a 19th-century warrior-king whose rule is often seen as marking the beginning of modern Ethiopian history. “He fought and died for this country,” says Teddy, gesturing at a painting of the monarch on the living room wall, and pointing out that they share the same name. But the problem for many of Teddy’s critics is that his is a fiercely disputed view of that history. To many modern Ethiopians, Tewodros represents feudalism and imperialism. To some, his rule was characterised by the conquest and subjugation of other ethnic groups. But to his supporters, he united the country and resisted European colonialism.

Teddy’s previous album, Tikur Sew, released in 2012, did something similar for an even more controversial figure, Emperor Menelik II, hero of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, which saw the defeat of the invading Italians, but also the man responsible for the conquest of much of modern-day Ethiopia. Teddy, like Tewodros, Menelik and Selassie, hails from the Amhara region; his critics see him as peddling a sort of nostalgic Amhara nationalism. His living room also contains an original sword belonging to Menelik, the old imperial flag, and a photograph of Selassie. “The younger generation need to know what our fathers did for this country,” he says. “It is clear that Menelik fought for Ethiopia, for unity, and against colonialism.”

Teddy Afro – Semberé

Although the album Ethiopia contains an eclectic mix of influences (the second track, Semberé, could be by Manu Chao), and lyrics in several of Ethiopia’s 88 languages, Teddy remains in many ways an Amhara musician. He recalls sitting as a young child on the knee of Hirut Bekele, a popular Amhara vocalist from the 60s and 70s, as she performed in small clubs in Addis Ababa. “She was like a queen,” he remembers. His early work was reggae-infused but in his recent albums he has returned to a more recognisably Ethiopian sound, though funkier and insistently catchy. Traditional vibrato vocals, the itchy triplets of traditional Amharan rhythms, highly polished synth-heavy production: all this is the language of modern Ethiopian pop.

The latter has often been a source of frustration to Ethiopia’s musical old guard, who lament the lack of instrumentation among the younger generation, although Teddy points out that a live band plays on the album’s final track. He is a child of two musicians – his mother was a dancer who toured the world, his father a songwriter for a police orchestra in 50s Addis Ababa – but he came of age in the 80s under the military regime known as the Derg, when live music all but disappeared as a result of a strict overnight curfew that lasted for 16 years. Like most pop stars of his generation who began their career amid the heady post-Derg optimism of the late-90s club circuit, Teddy sings and plays keyboard.

It is perhaps for this reason that Teddy is almost unheard of beyond Ethiopia and its diaspora. Despite its distinctly Ethiopian vernacular, his music is still pop: cosmopolitan and perfect for dancing to. Musicians such as Mahmoud Ahmed or Mulatu Astatke (the father of Ethiopian jazz) appeal to western audiences drawn to a more exotic sound, complete with live bands. Teddy doesn’t offer that. But in any case, his focus is closer to home. “This is a dangerous time,” he says. “My priority now is Ethiopia.”

WHY IS EPRDF APPEASING THE OROMO EXTREMIST ELITES?

By Yared Gizaw
Image result for melese and olf

The Oromo extremist elites have repeatedly told us that their vision for Ethiopia is as follows:

Option 1: Recreate/restructure Ethiopia under the domination of Oromos’ in which:

– Oromo language and culture to be dominant with “Wake Fatah” as dominant religion.

– New name and flag for Ethiopia

– Addis Ababa (Finfine) the center for Oromia

– Every Ethiopian to be under their dominion

Option 2: Free/independent Oromia (including Finfine) after disintegrating Ethiopia -this is a fall back scenario, if they could not achieve Option 1

As they know very well that Option 2 is impractical and not feasible, they are working very hard to realize Option 1 in an incremental manner.  More than 20 years ago, they secured the “Oromo land” with Latin alphabet written language and they have been busy to create a unique non-Ethiopian identity for themselves. Their next move is to strengthen their foothold on Addis Ababa, wait for an opportune time when the Federal Government is destabilized/weak, and declare their dominance. They have been asking for our arms and legs so far but they will not be satisfied until they fully swallowed all of our body. Actually, the Oromo extremist elites are never satisfied until  they  “Oromize” the whole Ethiopia.

The Oromo extremist elites have the following myths and false concepts in their mindset, which have shaped their vision of their future role/position in Ethiopia.

  • They perceive themselves as a  majority ethnic group( that is not true they need at least 51% share among the Ethiopian population to be majority even in that case it is unconstitutional to claim dominance )
  • They contribute higher share to the GDP( that is true but they are also getting the biggest share of the Federal Government Budget support and Foreign Direct Investment and the Oromo population have been enjoying better economic dividend than other regions as most of investments and job creation are around Addis Ababa). However, as industrialization and economic development expands  throughout the country and natural resources(such as oil and gas) start to be exploited in various regions, the GDP variation among the regions will narrow
  • They claim that they have been marginalized economically, socially and politically( that may have been true until Emperor Haile Selassie time but after that it is not true, actually EPRDF allowed them to have their own territory ( 1st time in their history, under unified Oromia) and they were allowed to freely develop their language, culture and religious practices over the last 26 years(including the recent registration of Irrecha annual anniversary by UNESCO as intangible asset)
  • They feel that they have higher negotiation power than other regions on the Federal government and they should use that to arm-twist the Federal government to achieve their Option 1 vision (They have the myth that Ethiopia cannot survive without Oromia or if Oromos’ revolt Ethiopia will be paralyzed). However, the fact is that even though they have tried to paralyze Ethiopia over the last two years, they have failed and they shall continue fail.

 

  • They have the victim mindset claiming that Emperor Menelik had killed huge number of Oromos’ who resisted his expansion agenda, however they tend to forget the atrocities committed by their nomadic ancestors  on the original citizens of today Oromia, some 400 and 500 years ago. It is recorded in history that the nomadic Oromos’ expanded their ‘territories to the northern part of Ethiopia through war and domination but failed to fully dominate it ( actually they were ultimately  swallowed and melted into  the Ethiopian time tested and sophisticated governance system). It looks the Oromo extremist elites are again trying to fulfill the unrealized dream of their ancestors to dominate Ethiopia.
  • For those Ethiopians who may feel my views, I reflected above on Oromo extremists are too exaggerated or not true, below is the front picture of the Oromia Cultural Center in Addis Ababa, which was inaugurated about two years ago, as proof. See how the widely spoken and constitutionally recognized working language of Ethiopia is written intentionally below both the Oromifa and English and with very small letters. This is the reflection of what they intend to do to anything non-Oromia Ethiopian assets and heritages. For your information if you write Amharic name of your business over/prior to the Oromifa name in the Oromia State, you will be immediately forced to change it. Why did the Addis Ababa city administration and the Federal Government have given blind eye to this gross violation of the constitution on the naming of the Oromo Cultural Center? Could it be to appease the Oromo extremist elites?

As a conclusion I strongly oppose most of the Council of Ministers approved draft legislation on Oromos rights on Addis Ababa, as summarized below

 

Provision in Draft Law Reason for Rejection/Opposing
Culture, language and arts:●       To ensure that Oromo residents in the city can benefit from the “special interest” provisions stipulated in this proclamation, Afaan Oromo shall serve as a working language of the City Administration.

●       To reflect Oromo people’s identity and to commemorate historical events relevant to the region’s people, the original names of public squares, roads and neighborhoods.

●       The city administration will facilitate conditions for the construction and promotion of theaters, entertainment venues, and cultural and art centers that reflect Oromo culture and history in the city.

●       The city administration will work with Oromia state authorities to make sure that museums in the city carrybooks and other artifacts on Oromo history and culture.

●       With relation to Oromia state, the city’s previous Oromo name, Finfine, will have equal legal recognition as the name Addis Ababa. The particulars on the usage of the two names will be determined by a regulation

Land provision:

●       The Oromia state will be given land on which it can erect buildings for government activities and public services free of lease payment.

Job opportunity:

●       Youth residents of Oromia towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa will be made beneficiaries of the job opportunities in the city.

●       Youth residents of Oromia towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa will be made beneficiaries of the job opportunities that arise from water development, waste disposal, recycling, basin development, transport services and the likes.

●       Health care: Oromo residents of towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa shall be entitled to access health care services at government hospitals and medical facilities like any resident of the city.

Provision of Market places:

●       The city administration shall establish market places, covering the cost, where farmers’ cooperatives from Oromia can sell their produce.

 

Condominium housing provision:

●       Officials and employees of Oromia will be included, having a certain quota, in the lottery drawings of government-owned condominium housing in Addis Ababa.

Compensation and permanent rehabilitation

●       Farmers in the city administration, who are displaced due to development activities, shall be entitled to compensation adequate for “permanent rehabilitation”.

–         What if other citizens in Addis Ababa ask to be served in their languages, we need to minimize issues that divide us rather than expand them. What about the rights of non-Oromo speaking but majority population in Adama (Nathret), Bishoftu (Debre Zeit) etc?

–         It is clear that this provision has no any historical merit, as there were no squares, roads and other sites in Addis Ababa during Minilik time. This decision will further bring division and conflict.

–         We have only 20% of the population in Addis Ababa as Oromo. What about the history, heritage and culture of the remaining 80% population who have worked hard to bring Addis Ababa where it is today?

 

 

–         Same as above

 

–         Using two legal names for Addis Ababa (Addis Ababa is a unifying melting pot for all Ethiopians and an anchor for the Federal government) will be confusing and no need to give it two names/brands. Imposed change of name/brand will be the source of perpetual conflict. If required, Oromia state could issue a law to recognize Finfine equal to Addis Ababa in it own territory.

–         As of today, Oromia has no constitutional right to use Addis Ababa as its base.

 

–         Unless the Ethiopian government is unknowingly facilitating the creation of an apartheid system, job opportunities anywhere in Ethiopia should be available equally to all Ethiopians based on competency. This provision is against the Constitution.

 

 

 

 

–         Does that mean Ethiopians form other than Addis Ababa & its surrounding will be discriminated?

 

 

–         What about Farmers Cooperatives from other parts of Ethiopia (Southern Ethiopia, Gojjam, Afar, Debre Berhan etc). This will create an apartheid system where one Ethnic group having undue comparative/competitive advantage. A potential for conflict!

 

–         Officials in Oromia have been acquiring and selling lands in different parts of Oromia. This is an additional gateway for corruption.(The practice have been an Oromia official from Bishoftu/Dukem will swap land with an Oromo official in Shashemene or Adama and through that arrangement so many of the Oromia officials are now investors).

Which countries will have the largest economies by 2100?

Which countries will have the largest economies by 2100?

  
Robert Parker

This is the political map of Europe in 1800

and the world map

And here is Europe in 1919:

and the world map:

Something changed in 100 years?

Well, the entire world was changed. A lot of monarchies and empires fell and a lot of new countries appeared – Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, etc in Europe. And many new countries around the world, including the US in its form! Big changes in 100 years, right?

Now, here is Europe today:

and the world:

Big changes in 100 years?

Well, yes – you can see the European Union, there is no USSR, many new countries appeared in Africa and Middle East, etc.

Now, you can see big changes in every 100 years – do you know what the situation would be in the next century?

I guess no one knows.

Maybe there will be no country by 2100, but a one world government?

World government – Wikipedia

David Tufte

There are three big determinants: population, how productive your citizens are, and will your country remain intact.

The first depends strongly on your population. More so as population growth in most places is slowing towards a rate of zero.

The second depends on how long you’ve been growing, and whether your cultures institutions support growth. By then, most countries will have been growing for a while. And better institutions seem to be something many cultures have been willing to choose (think East Asia).

Put those two together, and India will be the largest, China second, and the U.S. probably third. America could be passed by some other countries with large populations (Pakistan, Brazil, Nigeria, for example) but I think the American lead is too big. In the long-run, net immigration and Americans having more kids than other rich countries will win out.

The third point is tougher. Will India and China stick together? America tried that, and I don’t see it happening again.

I think a lot of parts will peal off of China. But I don’t think they’re large parts, so China’s population will stay quite large. There might be some south/north split, and that would clearly make a difference. That seems unlikely.

I would not be at all surprised if India fractured a bit. So many changes are coming their way from having a large economy that no one will know how to react.

So there you have it: India, China, America, with a possible flip-flop in the first two.

Yvan Testu

A country is just a recent concept mainly developed after 1918

Historically the main political tool used to organise the land was the Empire, at the beginning empires were limited to powerful cities protected by great walls from the tribes migrating into the surronding lands.

Then empires extented their control and projected power to much distant land, eventually some imperial powers were in competition for intermediary lands ( called Marshes )

Empires were divided, others cooperated, others have been challenged with modernisation and were unable to project power anymore so they just vanished, others had overtly conflictual interests that led to millenium long war

The treaty of Tordesillas divided the world in two, the west, spanish, and the east, portuguese

After the franco english confrontation that led to the independence of America, a doctrine later institutionalized by Monroe, rationalized the two hemispheres division, the Western hemisphere composed of north and south american continents will be under Washington supervision and the Eastern hemisphere encompassing all Europe, Asia and Africa continents will be under supervision of the main european powers, later called the colonial powers

As recently as 1910 the eastern hemisphere was still led by empires, most famous being the french empire, Britain, the dual germanic empires Austria and Prussia, the Russian empire, the Ottoman empire labelled Sick Man of Europe, the Japanese empire, the Dutch empire in Indonesia, the Chinese empire although profoundly in decay, some rests of the Portuguese and Spanish empires and a huge islamic zone stretching from Morocco to Indonesia divided between Persian, Turks and Turko mongols divided into Khanate and Sultanate

The reorganisation made in Paris after WW I started with the dismantlement of the Germanic, Austrian and Ottoman empires and a reorganisation of the British Raj Government of India Act, 1919 which were broken into economic entities called Nations, transnational institutions were created, most famous being the open and permanent diplomatic infrastructure called the League of Nations but they organized also large scale surveillance and established the control of human migration ( passport, visa,ID, custom control )

WW II precipited events, there is now almost 200 nations into the United Nations and America launch others transnational entities to help the international trade and to ease global finance ( OECD and IMF )

But this is only half of the story, Britain demonstrated that empires can be organized around water, rivers, sea, oceans that are the real trading lanes, harbors the real capital and straits ( Oresun, Dover, Gibraltar, Ormuz, Suez, Mallaca ) and Isles ( Malta, Cyprus ) the real strategic spots to protect.

Planes and stratospheric shuttles confirm the trend, human genius is less and less constrained by the tyranny of the land owners and warlords, even geography does not rule anymore, Switzerland recently opened an efficient tunnel breaking the Mont Blanc Massif obstacle

History has been written around the Land, the future will be written around the Water, nations inherited from the Land competition is now meaningless

Humanity will be divided into civilizations, but trading will be done around rivers, watersheds and seas

Here are the main watersheds in Europe

We can expect a creation of a danubian entity, an integration of the baltic states with the Dniepr watershed, and a breakup of the complex russian system

Concerning Europe the most possible scenario is a Greater Europe encompassing all hinterland of the Baltic, Northand Mediterranean sea

EU is already a rich entity but inside this entity some are blessed by the geography ( flat land, abondant rivers and lot of renewables energy ), the group Belgium, Netherland, Switzerland and Germany is still dominating the world economy and it is only a start

Yvan Testu’s answer to Is Britain set to be the strongest economy in Europe?

Joe Shady

I’m surprised that everyone’s mentioning China and India. I know population counts a lot in the economy but China and India are the most populous now.

A hundred years is a lot. Just look at the technological innovations and the steady shifting in the world maps that have taken place in the last century. Empires were broken down, colonies gained independence, China rose to prominence…a lot has gone down.

Now imagine a hundred years later taking history into account. There are lots of possibilities. Endless, really. A little event could radically change the world order.

Personally I have my money on African nation. Africa has the numbers, diversity , resources, market- it’s all there. In a hundred years, an African state(s) might get leaders who care about the nations that were thrust upon them by the colonisers, stand up to the West and uplift his people.

After that, it’s easy to imagine other African countries going the same way or the aforementioned state conquering neighbouring nations or just persuading them to form some union. God knows Africa has too many countries, each with it’s own leeches( politicians).

This could happen sooner than you think.

Arni Highfield

The United States

China has picked the low-hanging fruit. It will be difficult for them to continue the growth of recent decades. They have also entered the ‘Middle Income Trap’, but arrogantly are in denial, claiming that the rules of economics that apply to everybody else don’t apply to them.

Unless they get over this attitude, they will never fully realise their potential.

Europe is far too socialist and fragmented, and protectionist to take the lead. Russia is going backwards, and India, the last possible contender, has far too much ground to make up and intractable problems to solve. (Germany and Japan are just not big enough, same applies to UK. Brazil and Indonesia have, like India, too many institutional problems that are not easily resolved. )

Mathew Cherian

You are asking for a forecast 83 years ahead, to give a deterministic answer, it will be the world economy, assuming we might have inhabitants in other part of space who will be still young.

On the other hand, how technology is increasing the entropy of human lives existential demands, those who are around may be in particle state and economy may not be the way things work, then science would have reached its culmination of maintaining intelligence just by energy available from sun light.

How Egypt Is Slowly Losing Its Hold Over the Nile River?

WPR

How Egypt Is Slowly Losing Its Hold Over the Nile River

For millennia, the Nile River has served as the backbone of Egypt, the lifeblood of its people. Gradually, though, the land of the pharaohs is losing its grip.

Late last month, Uganda hosted the first ever heads-of-state summit aimed at resolving disagreements over the waters of the Nile. But it produced no major breakthrough and appeared to be a flop. In coming months, the opening of a major dam in Ethiopia will truly test Egypt’s anxieties that countries upstream are refusing to bow to its demands. The dam’s opening will reveal just how much leverage Egypt has lost.

Egypt has a strong historical and legal claim to the Nile dating back to the colonial era, but that framework is being undercut by rapid development and population growth upstream. Currently, more than 430 million people live across the 11 countries that make up the Nile Basin: Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea. The population of the Nile Basin is likely to jump to nearly 1 billion by 2050.

The upstream countries “can’t wait forever for Egypt to get onboard,” says Aaron Wolf, a professor of geosciences at Oregon State University. At the same time, he adds, the river is being valued less for its water supply and more as a means of producing electricity. “That whole conversation is shifting both the power balance and the interest to upstream states.”

Under a 1959 agreement, rights to virtually all of the Nile’s water was split between Egypt, which is entitled to 55.5 billion cubic meters, and Sudan, with 18.5 billion. Egyptians and Sudanese depend on the water much more than their upstream neighbors; Egypt in particular receives practically no rainfall, and relies on the mighty river for 97 percent of its water. But over the years, upstream countries have taken issue with the terms of that decades-old agreement, to which they were never parties.

In 1999, nine riparian countries formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try and manage the waters. South Sudan became the 10th member after it gained independence in 2011; Eritrea sits as an observer. The initiative began work on a new framework for governing the river, but Egypt and Sudan refused to sign on to a deal reached by other nations in 2010, known as the Entebbe Agreement. Egypt subsequently froze its participation in the initiative and has held out ever since, insisting it won’t return unless it is guaranteed notification before the construction of any new project on the river and until all decisions are made by consensus.

Other nations are loath to give Cairo de facto veto power over their domestic infrastructure plans. But to hear Egypt tell it, any major change to the framework and its historical water rights could leave it dying of thirst.

Sissi has made a noticeable push toward greater engagement with his African neighbors south of the Sahara, but the dispute over the Nile is proving to be a stubborn obstacle.

That position inspired Egypt’s initial opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is scheduled to open along the Blue Nile at some point in the next three or four months. Ethiopians view the dam, which will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric facility, as a source of national pride that they hope will power the continent’s fastest-growing economy. When construction is complete, the dam will stand more than a mile wide and 570 feet tall, and will more than double the country’s current capacity to generate energy. Waters from the Blue Nile comprise roughly 80 percent of the river that traces its way into Egypt.

For decades, Egyptian politicians have discussed any interference with the Nile’s waters as an existential threat. In 2013, Egyptian politicians unknowingly mused about sabotaging the Ethiopian dam on live television. Before construction began in 2011, Egypt reportedly considered a military response to block Ethiopia from interfering with the river’s flow. Decades earlier, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared that water was “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again.”

Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan—where the Blue and White Niles meet to form the great river—signed a deal to resolve their dispute in 2015. Egypt has since offered grumbling support for the dam, suggesting it recognizes the need to support upstream nations’ demands. Once the dam opens, no one expects Egypt to take a rash step and follow up on Sadat’s old threat.

But Egypt’s internal politics have made it difficult to back down entirely, so some amount of posturing is likely. Yet Cairo has few cards to play.

The more apocalyptic predictions about the dam’s impact on Egypt’s waters are likely overstated, says Kevin Wheeler of Oxford University’s Environmental Change Institute. “There’s a lot of hyperbole, ranging from some believing it’ll do nothing, to others claiming that it will devastate Egypt,” Wheeler says. “Neither of those two extremes are accurate, and there’s a lot of space in the middle for reality.” If anything, the dam could help regulate water flowing into Egypt and keep the country supplied during times of drought.

The biggest test will be in the first few years, as Ethiopia plugs up the Blue Nile to fill a vast new reservoir. If Egypt and Ethiopia are on the same page, Wheeler says, they will be best positioned to mitigate any droughts or water shortages. After that, water is likely to flow downstream at a constant pace.

The Ethiopian dam was not explicitly on the agenda during the recent Nile summit. But Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi were the only two foreign leaders who bothered to show up, suggesting that other nations want them to resolve their differences before anything else can be accomplished.

The summit began inauspiciously, when presidential guards for Sissi and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni got into a shoving match inside the State House, Uganda’s presidential residence. It didn’t get much better when technical teams from multiple countries reportedly walked out at one point during the discussions. Analysts said little of consequence had been achieved.

Sissi has made a noticeable push toward greater engagement with his African neighbors south of the Sahara, but the dispute over the Nile is proving to be a stubborn obstacle. Still, his presence in Kampala suggests that he recognizes Egypt’s changing position and is trying to maintain some authority.

With Egypt’s population set to grow by nearly 30 million by 2030, its own demand for water will increase. All the while, climate change will increase the variability of the river’s flow by 50 percent, according to a recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Nile’s volume is likely to rise by 10 to 15 percent, researchers predict, but there will also be more years of drought as well as years of surplus. All that instability might make it more appealing to rely on a system of dams that regularize and control the river’s flow.

The passage of time will force Egypt into signing on to a new or modified river management agreement, predicts Salman M. A. Salman, a consultant and former water law adviser for the World Bank. “Egypt will look right and left and will find that the dam is completed, that Ethiopia is trying to build other dams and the only alternative left for them is to cooperate,” Salman says. “Time is not on their side.”

Julian Hattem is a journalist based in Kampala, Uganda. You can follow him on Twitter at @jmhattem.

Egypt’s Nubians call for their right to return home

Successive governments have made a series of failed promises to compensate displaced Nubians for their losses.

In 2014, the Egyptian government officially recognised the Nubians as an ethnic group and promised them the right to return to their homeland [Tara Todras-Whitehill/Getty Images]

As the call to prayer crackles through the village loudspeaker, 82-year-old Aicha hunches over a rickety coffee table in her conical hut. She grasps at a string of prayer beads and begins to mutter under her breath, asking to return to her homeland.

“I remember all the details of my childhood village,” she says wistfully. “Fresh tilapia from the Nile, harvesting the date palms, the wheel that brought water from the river to our house; when we moved away, we lost everything.”

Aicha is among the first generation of Nubians internally displaced following the damming of the Nile more than 50 years ago, which forced 60,000 people to migrate north to the temporary shelters of Kom Ombo. Her home now lies submerged under one of the largest man-made lakes in the world, Lake Nasser.

“When we left, everybody was crying and kissing the earth. We only had two small bags with us, but we didn’t have the chance to go back to get anything else. I think about that day very often,” she says.


OPINION: Memo to Sisi – Don’t forget Nubia, Mr President


Since the construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1964, which flooded the Nubian villages, successive governments have made a series of failed promises to repatriate the Nubians and compensate them for their losses.

Under the 2014 Constitution, the Egyptian government officially recognised the Nubians as an ethnic group for the first time and promised them the right to return to their homeland. But a few months later, more than 2,400 square miles of land was reclassified as part of the state’s military zone and marked out for a large-scale agricultural project. The land is now being sold off to domestic and foreign investors, activists have pointed out.

“This project is not for the Nubians; it is for businessmen,” Nubian rights activist Fatma Emam said. “For the government, this is an opportunity to make money and to gain political power. It is not to help the Nubians.”

In recent months, Nubian activists have taken to the streets to protest the move. Last November, a caravan of more than 150 activists blocked a 300km stretch of road from Kom Ombo to Lake Nasser, calling for their right to return. Since then, activists have continued to mobilise online, and will not rule out the possibility of further protests.

There is a double discrimination. First as a citizen, because we do not have the same rights as an Egyptian; and secondly because we are a different race with a different language and heritage. This discrimination is harming all Egyptians.

Fatma Emam, Nubian rights activist

“This is the most effective way to pressure the government,” said Mohamed Azmy, a human rights lawyer and activist. “We have to ensure that this issue remains on the political agenda.”

During the November protest, Egyptian authorities prevented the caravan from travelling beyond a checkpoint, alleging that the demonstrators were acting against government policy. The activists then staged a sit-in at the checkpoint, remaining in their cars and blocking the road for three days.

“They threatened to arrest any Nubian who tried to cross the security checkpoint and they banned food or water from reaching the protesters without warning,” Azmy said. “But we continued regardless. We have nothing to fear.”

The protesters called for a rejection of the government’s agricultural project, an amendment to the 2014 Constitution to remove the Nubian villages from the designated military zone, and the implementation of a 10-year project to resettle Nubians in the “original areas” set out in the Constitution. There has been no official government response to these demands.

For many Nubians, the caravan was the first opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the government’s approach.

“They didn’t try to even negotiate with the Nubians,” said Wael, an activist in Abu Simbel whose name has been changed to protect his identity. “That made a huge hurt in the Nubians’ hearts.

“I agree with investing in this place, but you have to include the Nubians,” he added. “You have to partner or share this information so when they come back, they will find their land, not only companies.”

Alongside the state’s commercial interests, activists say that this is part of the Egyptian government’s plan to further marginalise Nubians in political, economic and cultural terms.

“There is a double discrimination,” Emam said. “First as a citizen, because we do not have the same rights as an Egyptian; and secondly because we are a different race with a different language and heritage. This discrimination is harming all Egyptians.”

Safar Mahmoud Hassan, former geology minister, who led the development of the Aswan High Dam in 1964, maintained that the Nubians’ calls have been heard and denied claims that the government will benefit financially.

“There has not been much investment yet. One village has been completed, but it is not possible for Nubians to live there, as the infrastructure is not in place,” he said, noting that he was optimistic that the involvement of foreign investors would bring jobs and growth to the area.

“Some businessmen have arrived from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and have started cultivating and working in the quarries,” Hassan added. “This is an area very rich in natural resources, especially mining resources. We have limestone, granite and clay quarries. This presents a growth opportunity for the Nubians and for all Egyptians.”

The Egyptian government has repeatedly said that it was facilitating a return for the displaced Nubians and seeking to develop the area to create employment and encourage tourism.

But in the meantime, activists say they will continue to draw international attention to the issue and to call for their right to return home.

“We have to keep up the pressure on the government to oblige them to fulfil their duties,” Azmy said. “They must give the Nubians the rights stipulated in the Constitution.”

For some Nubians, however, the changes may come too late.

As she gazed out at the barren wasteland from the temporary shelter where she has lived for more than 50 years, Aicha said: “I hope one day to see my homeland, to feel the earth between my toes. I have dreamed of returning for so long.”

Source: Al Jazeera

Why UNESCO Added Asmara (Africa’s Little Rome) to World Heritage list?

Fox

Image result for Asmara's modernist architecture

Eritrean officials say the decision by the U.N. cultural agency to put the African nation’s capital city of Asmara on the UNESCO World Heritage list is a “victory.”

The unanimous decision came Saturday at a session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in Poland. The decision appreciated the outstanding values of Asmara’s modernist architecture immersed in an African highland environment.

Eritrea’s ambassador to France and permanent representative to UNESCO, Hanna Simon, calls the decision the result of years of campaigning and a “victory not just for the Eritrean people but for Africa and the world at large.”

Eritrea’s government, however, has faced widespread criticism over what a U.N. commission of inquiry has said are numerous abuses including enslavement, rape and torture.

Eritrea is a major source of migration toward Europe.

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Former President Mubarak considered using Tu-160 to destroy Ethiopian dam

Egyptindependent

An unverified voice recording attributed to Egypt’s Former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak has generated great controversy among Egyptian social media users.

The recording, which surfaced on a Facebook page titled ‘Ana Asef Ya Rais’ [‘I’m sorry Mr. President’], featured statements from Mubarak on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ‘GERD’.

Mubarak relinquished power in 2011 following the 25 January Revolution and has been subjected to judicial trials since.

In the unverified voice clip, Mubarak said that Ethiopia did not dare to establish GERD during his era, adding that he had the ability to destroy it with Russian-made Tupolev Tu-160 fighters, if it had.

Mubarak also asserted in the recording that Egypt is currently considered a weak country, unlike in the past when the world saw it as powerful one.

Egypt Independent made several attempts to reach administrators of the Facebook page that broadcast the voice recording of Mubarak.