Does EU need a new approach on Ethiopia?

  • Addis Abeba. As a valuable friend, the EU needs to push Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces who rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and mass arrests. (Photo: Henrik Berger Jorgensen)

In January, the European Parliament passed a 19-point resolution condemning the Ethiopian government’s brutal crackdown on protests that had left more than a hundred dead. Many Ethiopians rejoiced at the resolution. I read it to some Ethiopian friends, who cried.

They had assumed Ethiopia was part of an international order in which no Western institution would dare criticise a trusted ally despite the government’s brutal repression.  They hoped the resolution would be a watershed in Europe’s relationship with Ethiopia.

But in the nine months since, the European Parliament’s outrage has not been matched by the European Union or its member countries. This despite the hundreds more Ethiopians killed throughout the country, the detention of tens of thousands, and widespread torture in detention, as we have documented.

Instead, on the sidelines of EU Development Days in June, High Representative Frederica Mogherini and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn worked on a joint declaration “Towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement” that proclaimed business as usual. While demonstrators were being shot, journalists and opposition members locked up, and peaceful activists punished, the EU was silently signing the cheques.

EU officials are quick to point to rare but tepid statements expressing concern for Ethiopia’s human rights situation but it’s not enough. The October 12 European parliamentary hearing on Ethiopia could be the catalyst for much stronger action —built on a willingness to use the considerable leverage that comes with providing various forms of support to the Ethiopian government, including €745 million in European aid for 2014-2020.

Ethiopia’s protests began last November in the largest region, Oromia, over the government’s development plans. Protests soon spread to the Amhara region where grievances focused on complex questions of ethnic identity and the dominance in economic and political affairs of people with ties to the ruling party.

Perfect storm

Security forces have shown no intention of changing their heavy-handed tactics, and the government hasn’t been willing to discuss the issues. The cycle of demonstrations and brutal government responses is feeding Ethiopia’s biggest political and human rights crisis in decades.

How this plays out could jeopardise Europe’s long-term interests in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia’s current crisis came as a surprise to many European policymakers, but it follows years of systematic government attacks on fundamental rights and freedoms, cutting off dissent.

Despite widespread frustration with the government, the ruling party is able to hold every one of the seats in the federal and regional parliaments.  The courts have shown little independence on politically sensitive cases, misusing  an anti-terrorism law to punish peaceful dissent.

There is little scrutiny of abusive security forces in part because of restrictions on independent media and NGOs. All of this has contributed to the complete closure of political space, creating the perfect storm.

An international investigation is needed

The EU is among many donors that have historically been silent about Ethiopia’s human rights abuses, afraid to risk strategic partnerships on development, migration, peacekeeping, and security.

Foreign diplomats and development organisations working in Ethiopia understand that you limit public criticism in exchange for access. The EU claims that “quiet diplomacy” is the most effective way to push Ethiopia in the right direction.

But given the dramatic deterioration in Ethiopia’s human rights record it’s hard to argue that this approach works.

Offering government benefits in exchange for silence is something many Ethiopians, particularly in rural areas, have known for years.

Ethiopia’s government carefully controls access to the benefits of development– including seeds, fertilisers, food aid, and jobs, much of it funded by the EU and its members.

To their credit, some African institutions have broken rank and expressed concern over the killings, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Union. And the United States, a key ally of Ethiopia, has been stronger than usual in condemning the use of lethal force, with forceful resolutions introduced in the US House and Senate.

Last month the UN’s top human rights official, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, said an international investigation is needed. A recent EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva echoed his call for an investigation, an important step that needs follow-up.

Investigate the killings

The EU needs a new approach to Ethiopia. Strategic relationships will become obsolete if Ethiopia plunges further into crisis, and all the signs are there.  As a valuable friend, the EU needs to push Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces who rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and mass arrests.

Ethiopia’s current approach to dissent guarantees future unrest and makes it less likely that the government will be able to find a way back to gain the trust of its citizens, all of which jeopardises the EU’s long term interests in the Horn.

The EU and its member states should continue to push for an international investigation into the killings, press the government to grant the UN access to investigate, and urge the government to hold to account security force members responsible for abuses.

By taking these steps, the EU and its member states can improve the potential for Ethiopians to be stable long-term partners.

Felix Horne is the senior Ethiopia researcher at Human Rights Watch.

Mugabe: AU Will Form Splinter Group if Not Given Permanent UN Seat

Sebastian Mhofu

Zimbawe's president, Robert Mugabe, gestures as he addresses supporters of his ruling ZANU-PF party at Harare International Airport, Zimbabwe, Sept. 24, 2016.

Zimbawe’s president, Robert Mugabe, gestures as he addresses supporters of his ruling ZANU-PF party at Harare International Airport, Zimbabwe, Sept. 24, 2016.

Zimbabwe’s president said Saturday that the African Union was planning to form a splinter group with countries such as Russia, China and India if the U.N. Security Council did not include members of his continent next year.President Robert Mugabe said the African Union was still concerned that it had no permanent seats on the Security Council.

Upon arrival in Harare from New York and this year’s U.N. General Assembly late Saturday, the 92-year-old Zimbabwean leader told ZANU-PF supporters that the African Union wanted to be on the Security Council if veto powers of the five permanent members — China, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and Russia — were not removed.

“It is not all permanent members being tough. It is Britain, France and [the United States of] America,” he said. “If they remain adamant, they must not cry foul when we agree to form our own organization with countries like China, India and other Asian countries. This is what we want to do next year in September, when we have made a commitment.”

During his 30-minute speech, Mugabe did not refer to calls made Thursday by his Botswana counterpart, Ian Khama, to step down and allow fresh blood to improve Zimbabwe’s economy.

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Israel’s African Union Observer Bid: An Uphill Struggle

Huffingtonpost- In early July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a historic four-nation trip to East Africa. The trip was a resounding success. Netanyahu’s aspirations of becoming a global statesman were boosted considerably by the willingness of African leaders to expand their trade and security linkages with Israel. Israel’s goal of becoming an observer state in the African Union (AU) also gained momentum, as the leaders of Ethiopia and Kenya endorsed Israel’s AU observer bid.

Despite these positive developments, Israel’s desire to become an AU observer state and expand its diplomatic involvement in Africa is fraught with many obstacles. Even though Israel was an observer state in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) until its dissolution in 2002, eleven African countries still do not recognize Israel’s right to exist. Israel’s support for Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, and alleged arms exports to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide have ensured that anti-Israel sentiments remain widespread amongst Africa’s political elites.

Visceral anti-Israel hostilities have even surfaced within African countries with close ties to Jerusalem. During Netanyahu’s visit to Kampala, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni repeatedly referred to Israel as “Palestine.” This deliberate mix-up was covered extensively in the international press and overshadowed the Netanyahu-Museveni bilateral summit.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) AU observer status also complicates Israel’s hopes of increasing its involvement in the African Union. Since 2013, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has called for an African boycott of Israeli goods and has urged AU members to support peace negotiations on Palestine’s terms. As Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories has been widely criticized in Africa, Abbas’s anti-Israel rhetoric has resonated strongly with many African leaders.

The ideological synergy between African leaders and Palestinian nationalists was strikingly revealed by Abbas’s praise for the AU’s solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Some African officials are concerned that Israel’s membership in the AU could polarize African leaders’ views on the Israel-Palestine conflict and weaken the AU’s harmony.

In addition to tensions over Palestine, two major AU member states, South Africa and Egypt will likely oppose Israel’s application for AU observer status. South Africa’s opposition to Israel becoming an AU observer can be explained by the governing African National Congress (ANC)’s belief that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is as egregious as apartheid. Israel’s extensive economic linkages to South Africa’s National Party government during the 1970s and 1980s has caused allegations of Israeli apartheid in Palestine to resonate strongly with the South African public.

Even though Israeli heads of state like Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert reached out to the ANC to improve Jerusalem-Pretoria relations, the ANC has remained stridently critical of Israel. In June, the ANC condemned the opposition Democratic Alliance’s close relations with Israel, praised the 200,000 South Africans who campaigned for the Palestinian cause in the Western Cape region, and expressed solidarity with Palestine against “Israeli apartheid.” Many analysts have speculated that Netanyahu’s decision not to visit the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa was the result of a snub by the AU Commission’s South African head, Nkosanza Zuma’s.

Egypt’s opposition to Israeli observer status in the AU dates back to the Hosni Mubarak era. Even though large African states like Ethiopia, Nigeria and Kenya strongly supported Israel’s campaign to become an AU observer in 2003, Egyptstaunchly opposed Israel’s inclusion in the organization. Egyptian policymakers feared that Israel would use AU membership to back Ethiopia’s claims to the Nile River basin. As tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia have increased in recent months, Cairo’s position on Israel’s accession as an AU observer is unlikely to change.

Although Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 2013 coup strained the Egypt-AU relationship, Egypt’s AU membership was restored earlier this year. Egypt will host the Pan-African Parliament’s October 2016 session at Sharm al-Sheikh. During the October parliamentary session, Egypt is expected to reject Ethiopia’s colonial history-based claims to the Nile River basin. Israel’s strong relationships with both Ethiopia and Egypt could force Netanyahu to take a neutral stance out of strategic necessity. This non-committal approach to one of Africa’s most heated territorial disputes could cause Ethiopia to scale back its support for Israel’s AU observer status bid.

Even if Israel gains enough African support to neutralize potential opposition from South Africa and Egypt, Jerusalem’s role in Africa remains highly controversial. In recent months, Israel has attempted to act as a mediator between the United States and AU countries that have strained relations with Washington.

Israel has urged the United States to improve its relationship with Sudan, as Khartoum has distanced itself from Iran’s geopolitical clutches since late 2014. Even though Israeli officials have expressed concerns about Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s deplorable human rights record, Israeli policymakers have covertly urged European policymakers to ameliorate Sudan’s crippling $50 billion debt burden.

Sudan has responded negatively to Israel’s willingness to facilitate Khartoum’s normalization relations with the West. The Sudanese government has insisted that any improvement in Khartoum-Washington relations will occur through bilateral dialogues that exclude Israel. Some Sudanese policymakers are concerned that Israel’s leverage over US policy decisions could alter Washington’s approach to Sudan in a way that unduly benefits Netanyahu’s anti-Iran agenda.

Ethiopia’s contention that Israel is a constructive presence on the world stage has countered Sudan’s animosity towards Israeli diplomacy in Africa. Yet past grievances towards Israel continue to undercut the success of Israel’s soft power campaign in Africa. With notable exceptions like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, the perception that Israeli diplomats are acting at the behest of American interests has prevented anti-Western authoritarian leaders in Africa from embracing Israel as a constructive diplomatic presence in the AU.

Under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel’s efforts to expand its diplomatic footprint in Africa have made striking progress. But historical legacies and anti-Israeli sentiments within many crucial AU member states could undercut Israel’s ambition of becoming an active observer within the African Union. It remains to be seen whether Israeli peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance initiatives increase Israel’s soft power enough for anti-Western African leaders to soften their opposition to a closer Israel-Africa relationship.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who writes regularly for the Washington Post, The Diplomat and National Interest magazine. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.