Egypt Boosts Navy As Part Of Red Sea Controlling Strategy

By Amr Emam,  

Over the past two years, Egypt spent bil­lions to upgrade its navy, buying helicopter carriers from France, frigates from Russia and subma­rines from Germany. Photo by AHMED XIV/Wikimedia

CAIRO, Egypt — By establishing a naval force in the Red Sea, Egypt aims for more than protecting navigation in the Suez Canal, a vital wa­terway for international trade, mili­tary experts said.

“The force will be the backbone of Egypt’s new Red Sea strategy,” former Assistant Defense Minis­ter Hossam Suweilam said. “There is a marked surge of unrest in the southern entrance to the Red Sea, which needs an aggressive policy.”

The new force utilizes recently acquired naval equipment, includ­ing a French-made multifunction helicopter carrier.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said the new force would help his country protect its coast. Defense Minister Sedki Sobhi said the force would help Egypt impose control on its territorial waters in the Red Sea.

Cash-strapped Egypt spent bil­lions of dollars to upgrade its navy over the past two years. It bought two helicopter carriers from France, frigates from Russia and subma­rines from Germany. Cairo does this for a purpose, military experts said.

In 2015, Egypt spent almost $8 billion to dig a parallel channel to shorten transit time in the Suez Ca­nal. It also dug tunnels under the canal to deliver water and ease the movement of people and goods to and from Sinai.

These huge investments are only part of Egypt’s vision for the Suez Canal region, one that cannot be implemented without proper secu­rity in the Red Sea, experts said.

Egypt wants to turn the banks of the canal into an investment mag­net where vast industrial zones, huge logistics areas and extensive service facilities are planned. Egypt plans to attract hundreds of bil­lions of dollars in investments to the region. In 2015, revenues from the Suez Canal totaled $5.2 bil­lion, which did a lot to buoy Egypt’s struggling economy.

Analysts in Cairo said Sisi does not squander the limited funds available at the central bank with a purpose in mind.

Last April 8, Sisi ordered Prime Minister Sherif Ismail to sign a mar­itime border demarcation agree­ment with Saudi Arabia. The deal includes the handover of two dis­puted Red Sea islands to Riyadh. Egyptians now debate whether the islands are Saudi.

Absent from the conversation, however, are the reasons Sisi insists to demarcate the maritime border with the Saudis. He has said Egypt cannot explore its territorial wa­ters for oil without defining its sea boundaries.

He mentioned a similar agree­ment with Greece and Cyprus. A few months after Egypt signed the agreement with both states, Italian state-owned petroleum company Eni announced the discovery of the East Mediterranean’s largest natu­ral gas field off Egypt’s coast.

There is a strong probability of Egypt’s territorial Red Sea waters containing wealth so huge that Sisi is ready to risk angering his people with the maritime border demarca­tion deal with Saudi Arabia.

“Such a potential wealth is badly in need of a military power to pro­tect it,” said Nasr Salem, a lecturer at Nasser Military Academy, the army’s strategic and military sci­ence institute. “We cannot leave the billions of dollars we spend on investments in the Red Sea without protection.”

Parliament is to debate the deal soon. Analysts expect that after deal approval, Egypt would offer concessions to international oil firms to explore Red Sea territorial waters.

Fear for these investments and potential wealth lies, meanwhile, more southward, near the coast of restive Yemen where the Houthi militia controls key port cities near the Bab el Mandeb strait, politi­cal experts said. The Houthis have threatened Red Sea navigation many times.

The establishment of the new Egyptian naval fleet comes after pro-Saudi forces in Yemen failed to capture the country’s port cities.

The fear in Egypt is that the Houthis can threaten traffic in the strait, which would deal an irre­versible blow to the Suez Canal.

Close to 4 million barrels of oil pass through the Bab el Mandeb strait en route to markets in Europe and the United States every day, most of which is moved through the Suez Canal, the U.S. Energy In­formation Administration said.

A disruption of traffic at the strait would be catastrophic to Egypt and the world.

“This is exactly why Egypt takes the security of this area very seri­ously,” said Mohamed Kamal, a political science professor at Cairo University. “Whoever controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea will control the Suez Canal and Egypt cannot leave this control in the hands of anybody else.”

This article originally appeared at The Arab Weekly.

Yemen’s Central Bank moves to Aden. So what’s next?

Middle East

Houthi rebels

File photo of Houthi rebels

The current Yemeni government under Hadi has been very disconnected from the capital city Sana’a since the start of the coup. It is often forgotten that at the beginning of August last year, the then-governor of Aden, Nayef Al Bakri, announced that Aden was to become the capital city of Yemen for the next five years. This decision was welcomed for many reasons that range from the political to the economic, but it also signalled that the Yemeni government was losing hope of regaining Sana’a in the near future. Such sentiments can only be seen as being amplified following the government’s latest move of transferring the country’s central bank to Aden.

Militarily speaking, the Houthis and former Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh have the upper hand in Sana’a. They have complete control of governmental institutions and local resistance forces have not been making advances against the Houthi and Saleh militias. It is also clear that the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes are not helping to clear Sana’a of militia forces. Currently, whatever is in Sana’a is subject to being coerced, threatened or swayed by the Houthis and Saleh, including the Central Bank.

The bank is seen as the last hope for some form of stability in Yemen with the political and security situation spiralling out of control. Exports have decreased dramatically and the government is finding it increasingly difficult to pay for imports. The fact that there is $5 billion missing from the bank means that the country’s economic security is at high risk.

In Sana’a, the Houthis and Saleh have been using the Central Bank to fund their war expenses. In August, the president of the Houthi revolutionary committee announced a pledge of 1 billion Yemeni riyals (just under $4 million) to restore Saleh’s Republican Guard. The Houthis have also recently stolen $1.2 million of public funds to start a radio station after they broke into the Central Bank’s headquarters. This is despite the fact that, in May, the Central Bank stated that it will allow for $100 million a month to finance the Houthi-Saleh side to the war.

Politically speaking, Mohamed bin Hammam, the former governor of the Central Bank was seen as an ally to the Houthis. In August, the Hadi government openly announced its mistrust toward the former governor, accusing him of turning a blind eye to the Houthi and Saleh induced corruption in the bank. Houthi spokesman Mohamed Abdel Salam slammed the government’s decision to dismiss Hammam, along with the decision to relocate the bank earlier this week, perpetuating sentiments of the bank being subjected to Houthi and Saleh corruption if it remained in Sana’a. This is making it harder for aid to get to the Yemeni people and even making creditors and donors reluctant to pay sums of money into the bank.

Having the Central Bank situated in the temporary capital means there will be a significant amount of autonomy for Aden. The Adeni authorities will most likely receive a priority for financing and pay, including civil servants many of whom have not yet received their salaries.

It will also affect the separatism debate. On the one hand, taking the Central Bank out of Sana’a could calm separatist views, as one of the main grievances for southerners was that the Yemeni government was centralised in Sana’a under Saleh who purposely marginalised southerners. On the other hand, the bank’s move could also mean separatist perceptions could be heightened as it poses an opportunity for southern Yemen to institutionally prepare itself for autonomy. This is something only southern Yemenis can decide for themselves at some time in the future.

The Central Bank is the last lifeline for Yemen. With war and famine widespread across the country, the faltering of economic security could be catastrophic. Though the move of relocating the Central Bank is overdue and ideally should have been done in September 2014 after the Houthi coup, it is one of the only ways to ensure money does not continue to pour itself into the militia forces. Now, the country faces the challenging process of relocating the bank and preventing any further corruption and damage from occurring to the economy.

US on collision course with China in the Red Sea

Two major developments in Somalia and Djibouti have attracted international media attention recently. John Kerry became the first US Secretary of State to visit Mogadishu, whilst China has negotiated the construction of a military base in the strategic port of Djibouti. These two “symbolic” and substantive developments represent both an opportunity and a challenge for

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