3 Key Issues The African Union Has To Deal With At Its Ethiopia Summit

Choosing a new leader and preventing genocide are just a couple of the AU’s priorities.

Once a year, the heads of 54 African countries gather in the Ethiopian capital to hammer out solutions (or not) to the continent’s big issues.

The 28th African Union Summit opened on Monday in Addis Ababa, and the agenda is looking pretty full.

1. The Morocco Conundrum

After a 33-year absence, the only mainland country that is not part of the AU wants to rejoin. Morocco left what was then known as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984 in a dispute over the status of Western Sahara, a desert state the size of Colorado that has been the center of an independence struggle for several decades.

In Morocco’s eyes, Western Sahara is part of its territory. But an organization founded by the indigenous Sahrawi people, the Polisario Front, launched a guerrilla struggle in the early 1970s to demand that the area be recognized as an independent state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Supported by Algeria, the Polisario Front received the backing of a majority of OAU members in a vote in 1984 on its claim of territorial integrity in Western Sahara, prompting Morocco to quit the bloc. A diplomatic stalemate has ensued in the region, despite calls by the AU and the U.N. for a referendum. Tensions were reignited in 2016 when former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon referred to the region as under “occupation,” a comment decried by Moroccan leaders and people who took to the streets to protest.

Morocco submitted its application to rejoin the AU in September 2016, and the country’s foreign minister said in January that it has the support of the majority of the bloc’s members. But the bid could still face resistance from some of Africa’s major powers. According to AFP reports on Monday, 12 countries including Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria, have requested a legal opinion from the AU as to whether Morocco could be readmitted while some members believe it is be occupying the territory of another member state—i.e. the SADR.

Morocco Western Sahara protestMoroccan protesters hold placards during a demonstration against comments by Ban Ki-moon on Western Sahara in Rabat, on March 13, 2016. Morocco asserts that Western Sahara is part of its territory, though Ban referred to it as under “occupation.”FADEL SENNA/AFP/GETTY

2. Preventing Genocide in South Sudan

The situation in South Sudan is perhaps the most urgent issue in sub-Saharan Africa. Writing in Newsweek in December 2016, former U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon said that the risk of “mass atrocities” in South Sudan—which has been mired in civil war on and off since December 2013—“escalating into possible genocide is all too real.”

Despite the leaders of the opposing factions—President Salva Kiir and ex-vice-president Riek Machar—signing a peace agreement in August 2015, South Sudan continues to be convulsed by violence. A fresh outbreak of fighting in July 2016 has led to tens of thousands of people fleeing the country, and ethnic tensions have reportedly become a significant factor in the conflict: Kiir is a member of the majority Dinka, while Machar comes from the Nuer ethnic minority. Experts have warned of a second Rwanda, referring to that country’s ethnic genocide in 1994, in which at least 800,000 members of the Tutsi minority and moderate members of the Hutu majority died at the hands of Hutu extremists.

In a joint emailed statement on Sunday, the AU, U.N. and regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development “expressed their deep concerns over the continuing spread of fighting, and risk of inter-communal violence escalating into mass atrocities, and the dire humanitarian situation in South Sudan.” But with the international community so far failing to mitigate the crisis—the U.N. Security Council, for example, has consistently failed to impose an arms embargo on the country—the AU will have to come up with more than just words in order to be seen as making real progress in South Sudan.

South Sudan soldiersSouth Sudanese government soldiers celebrate while standing in trenches in Lelo, outside Malakal, South Sudan, October 16. Experts have warned of the risk of genocide in the country, where civil conflict has raged since December 2013.ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

3. Uniting Around a New Leader

The summit marks the end of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure as head of the AU Commission. Five candidates are competing to replace Dlamini-Zuma, whose term has ended; she is likely to run later this year to succeed her former husband, Jacob Zuma, as leader of South Africa’s governing African National Congress.

The vote on the next AU leader could well expose divisions in the organization. Three of the five candidates—Chad’s foreign minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, Kenyan foreign minister Amina Mohamed, and Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal—are the most likely contenders, but voting could be complicated by a tradition that means the post tends to rotate between candidates from Anglophone and Francophone countries. If tradition is followed, Mahamat and Bathily would have an advantage—even though Kenya has been vocal in campaigning for votes for Mohamed.

In order to win, a candidate requires two-thirds of the votes, and a deadlock followed by political wrangling is a real possibility. That happened in 2012: Dlamini-Zuma was only elected in a second ballot after the first produced a stalemate and led to the incumbent having his term extended by six months.

 

Why Do Ethiopians Trivialize Truth and Tolerate Lies?

By Tedla Woldeyohannes (PhD)*

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We do not need to dwell on various theories of truth (there are several) in order to make progress with the issues I am interested to address in this piece. [I make use of the idea of truth as correspondence without comparing it to other theories since it is the most basic of idea of truth]. It is enough to note that all of us have some idea about what “truth” is without a help from theoretical, philosophical discussions of the nature of truth. If we do not have an idea of truth, we can hardly tell when someone tells us a lie. But almost all of us are able to tell when we are lied to unless the lie is too sophisticated to tell it is a lie initially. Consider the following for a basic idea of truth:  A claim or a statement is true means things are the way they are stated to be by the claim, or the statement. For example: A claim that there is a computer on your desk is true when there actually is a computer on your desk; otherwise false.  That is to say what the claim states matches reality.  For example, when you tell someone that there are four tables in your room when there are actually two tables, you are not telling the truth, especially if you know that there are four tables. Lying is closely connected to truth in the sense that it is knowingly telling the opposite of what is true. Lying, at the very least, involves telling something that is untrue when you know the truth. Lying is intentional as deception is. To report something falsely, by mistake, without intentionally misrepresenting the truth is not a deception or a lie. The moral of this reflection: All of us have a basic idea of what is truth and generally we are able to distinguish intentionally made false statements or lies from true statements. We do not need to teach even young children about what truth is, though we teach them to value truth, that lying is bad, and such things. We have a cognitive capacity to recognize truth, or what is true, and to distinguish truth from falsehood that no body taught us. No need to digress for further philosophical discussion for the purpose of this piece.


Trivializing Truth

Recently I had an opportunity to speak at a conference in Washington D.C. The conference was a gathering of various Ethiopian political parties in the Diaspora. One of the main points of discussion at this conference was aimed at finding an answer to the question why opposition political parties do not effectively work together for a common goal and how they can come together to offer themselves as an alternative to the regime in power if the regime collapses or goes away sooner or later.  In this article,  I expand my talk at this conference where I offered what I take to be one plausible answer to the question raised at the conference, which I think has a much broader implication for our society, in the realm of politics and otherwise. In my view, one of the main reasons why we, Ethiopians, in general, suffer from a continuous lack of genuine cooperation to effectively work for the common good is because of the way we, generally, treat truth or the value of truth. That is, in my view, our society and culture trivializes truth and the value of truth. I take it that treating truth trivially, among other things, leads to some of the widespread problems in our country. This article develops this idea.

Now to one of the main points of this article. In my view, in our Ethiopian culture many people do not care about truth or the value of truth for its own sake; rather, many people care about what benefit they can get if they tell the truth about many issues in life. This mindset, which is widely shared, makes it hard for people to value truth or to care about truth for its own sake or to stand for truth when standing for truth is important. To care about truth for its own sake means valuing truth and speaking the truth whether one gets something or not as a result of speaking the truth.  Inquisitive minds generally are inclined and want to know the truth about anything of interest to them, for the sake of knowing, period. And such minds speak the truth, all things considered, when needed because speaking the truth is a good thing, period. But this does not mean that caring about truth for its own sake is always incompatible with caring about truth for its value in the sense of helping us get what we want. This latter is valuing truth as a means or a tool for some other end or goal. That is fine. But valuing truth only to gain something is problematic. An indifference to truth or caring little about truth creates a mindset that discourages pursuit of truth, openness to truth, a desire for intellectual integrity. In my view, lack of a desire for intellectual integrity commodifies truth and this in turn results in trivializing the value of truth. All of these things are rampant in our Ethiopian culture.

Tolerating Lies

One consequence of caring about truth or valuing truth only as a means to get something can and does lead to easy lying. Lying becomes easier when a person cares about truth only for what one can gain if that person tells the truth or not. Note that in most cases people lie to gain something.  With the exception of pathological or habitual liars who find lying so easy that lying becomes their second nature, generally, people lie when they want to get something that they would not get if they tell the truth. When a culture like ours does not oppose lying, which is rampant in our society, it is not hard to see the larger consequence for such a shared culture. Anyone who knows our culture and interpersonal communications knows how often people who lie about this or that can get away with the lie without being challenged. The extent of tolerance for lies in our culture extends, for example, to even Christians who believe that lying is a “sin” but who often refuse to challenge lying in their community. I mention Christians as an example to show how much pervasive lying is in the Ethiopian community. Christians and other religious people who believe lying is sin should be at the forefront in challenging people who lie to them, but that rarely happens to be the case. Lying need not be seen as a “sin” in order to show that it is bad. Whether lying is “sin” or not, it is bad, all things considered. At any rate, tolerance to lies has a negative consequence which is bad for a society.

 Suspicion, Lack of Trust, and Secrecy

When people realize that lying is widely tolerated, if and when they lie they also tend to believe that others are lying to them even if that is not the case. That means, people who lie become suspicious of others often thinking that the other person is also lying to them. This gives rise to an attitude that encourages treating others with suspicion. Suspicion of others and what people hear could be a lie rather than the truth about this or that also gives rise to a culture of secrecy. Besides suspicion, secrecy is one of those widely shared cultural traits among Ethiopians. Note that there are good reasons at times to value secrecy or withholding some information from others in a country where telling the truth can cost lives. I am making this point for the following reason: The kind of government we have, now and in the past, especially the previous regime before this, forced us to,  rightly, believe that  the government can do harm if it finds out information about people the government targets for political reasons. Having said this, I am not suggesting that the widespread culture of suspicion and secrecy is only due to the government’s treatment of the citizens. The government’s treatment of citizens is an exception when it comes to an explanation for why secrecy and suspicion are widespread in our culture. I argued above, in general, it is an attitude to the value of truth that leads to a culture in which lying becomes easy and tolerated, and that gives rise to suspicion of others, especially what they say which encourages secrecy.

Truth and Character

Let us briefly consider a connection between how we value truth can affect our character. It is not controversial to suggest that a person who does not care much about truth would not care much about personal integrity. Personal integrity and honesty are among virtues anyone desires to cultivate. By “virtues” I mean good character traits.  Obviously, people who demonstrate personal integrity and honesty are admirable and rightly admired. But in a culture that significantly encourages dishonesty and lies, honest people who aspire to be persons of integrity are considered threats to those who do not want to lose what they could get by choosing to lie and deceive others. To value truth for its own sake, whether one gains something or not for telling the truth, is a good reason for a person to choose to be truthful. Truthfulness is a virtue by itself and also a truthful person can be faithful, dependable, or reliable. Even those who choose to lie and engage in deception would not, in their right mind, believe that liars and deceptive and dishonest people are dependable or reliable as people. So far, we have seen a sketch of reasoning that shows   that one’s relation to truth can and does have implications for one’s character. Lying and deception are character flaws, but these character flaws have roots, among others, in one’s treatment of truth and how much one cares about the value of truth—very little.  Those who care about truth demonstrate character traits such as truthfulness, honesty, and personal integrity. This reasoning shows that our cognitive life is deeply connected to our moral life and our character.

Application

Let us briefly illustrate the above discussion by taking concrete examples. Let us take the Ethiopian government first. Lying in countless ways is the modus operandi for the Ethiopian government. Why is that the case? As anyone familiar with the Ethiopian government knows it is practically impossible for the government to remain in power without the power of the gun if the regime tells the truth about so many crimes it commits against the citizens. Note that I argued above that a lie is intentional and people generally lie to get something they would not get if they told the truth. If the regime tells the truth, for example, about the human rights it violates, the actual number of people killed by the regime, and the actual reasons why it jails those who are critical of the regime, including journalists and opposition party members, etc., there is no way for such a government to stay in power without resorting to violence. Hence, lying in order to deceive and to cover up what is real, is its modus operandi, or its mode of operation or its default position. The regime would tell the truth when it is convenient and when it would not lose much by telling the truth. Or, the regime would tell the truth sometimes when it is useful for the government to tell the truth not because those in government care about truth and value truth for its own sake. Now, we need to ask why this is the case. One plausible answer emerges from what I argued above. That is the government is largely a reflection of the culture of the society it comes from. Or, in other words, the Ethiopian government is a mirror image of how the Ethiopian people tolerate lies, or how little truth and truthfulness are valued in the culture. I claimed that there is a widespread mindset of tolerance to lying in our culture. It is only beneficial for those in power to make use of what is widely tolerated in their own society—a disposition to lie about small and big things mostly without being challenged.

With so much lying by the Ethiopian government it is nearly impossible, for example, for opposition party leaders to trust the government in order to come to the table to discuss political options for the future of the country. Some opposition party leaders would join the government [as it is happening these days] for discussion not because they believe that the regime is truthful. They can do so for their own reasons, which would lead to doing nothing significant for the future of the country because such political leaders are playing by the rule the regime has set for them—which has no genuine room for any genuine reform of the deeply corrupt government. At the end of the day, how can anyone trust a government that has practically eliminated a genuine political space for opposition parties either by jailing their leaders or when many have left the country for life in exile?

Unfortunately, there is a much similar explanation as to why it is hard for opposition party leaders to come to a table to work together for a common goal. As I remarked in my recent talk at the Washington DC conference of the Diaspora based Ethiopian opposition parties, it is hard for opposition parties to come together for a common purpose when there is a trust deficit or when there is not enough trust. When members and leaders of opposition parties are suspicious of one another and engage in secrecy and lack transparency, it is hard to come together for a common purpose. I am not suggesting that the points I raised in this article totally, or exhaustively explain the reason why it has become very hard for opposition parties to come together to work for a common good, but the issues I raised play a key role, in my view, in explaining failures among the opposition parties to come together to work together. At the very least, trust is essential for people to come together to work for a common good.

A related explanation for continued failures of the opposition parties to work together can be due to misplaced priorities. If and when the interest of the people of Ethiopia, not the interest of the personalities behind various opposition parties, is the main and non-negotiable priority for opposition parties, the rest is for them to work on a strategy how to get to a mutually held goal and compromise on the strategy going forward. So long as party priorities are not aligned around a non-negotiable common purpose, it would be hard for opposition parties to come together.  Oftentimes, opposition parties fail when their leaders fail mostly on character flaws or when the leaders end up pursuing their own selfish interests. This takes us back to issues about lack of personal integrity and honesty and lack of transparency. These flaws can partly be traced back to people’s relation to truth or how they value of truth and how this can lead to lying or tolerating lies and being dishonest and deceptive.

Conclusion

One can give a lot more examples to show how a widely shared culture of trivializing truth or a widely shared mindset that does not value truth and truthfulness for its own sake can easily lead to lying and to tolerance to lying. Tolerance to lying gives rise to a culture of suspicion and secrecy which eventually leads to lack of trust among people. I used as an illustration what happens in our politics to make points about the value of truth and the problem of valuing truth only for what truth telling can do for us. Or, I argued that attaching the value of truth to benefits people can get if they spoke truth can lead to problems that eventually manifest in character flaws and these in turn deeply damage a political space which is an arena of moral agency. As moral agents, humans cannot escape being judged by their character and all those who seek leadership positions, including those who are in leadership positions like the Ethiopian government, can only succeed in their leadership to the extent that they succeed as responsible moral agents. It is nearly impossible to expect any meaningful change from the Ethiopian government when it comes to holding a meaningful dialogue with opposition parties. However, it is also an imperative for the opposition political parties to play a role of responsible moral agency going forward. Responsible moral agency is not an abstract talk; rather, it is something that can be demonstrated in real life when those who seek leadership positions first demonstrate that they care about truth, that they will not tolerate lying in their own lives and in others, and  when they lead others with a life of  personal integrity and transparency.

In the final analysis, the cost of trivializing truth and tolerating lies is monumental, both on a personal and on a national level. I leave my readers, especially those who aspire to hold leadership positions to bring about a much needed change in Ethiopian politics to ask themselves the following questions and to answer them honestly and to the best of their ability: Do I really care about truth? Do I really care about being a truthful person? Do I really care about personal integrity and transparency? Do I lie for small or big things to gain something in return? Do I challenge people who lie to me when I know someone is lying to me? Am afraid of challenging a lie when I know it is a lie? Why am I afraid to challenge a lie if I am afraid to do so? Do I put the interest of the Ethiopian people above my own interest and the interest of a party I am a leader? Do I challenge selfish party members and leaders who pursue their own interests at the expense of the interest of the Ethiopian people? Is a party I am a part better than the ruling party in terms of standing for moral character of its members and leaders? How can I and my colleagues prove to the Ethiopian people that we are better leaders who can lead fellow Ethiopians than the ruling party? Can I and my colleagues say “no” to the temptation of seeking power for the sake of being in power and instead show our people that having political power is all about serving fellow citizens? Do I really believe that power is not the goal of my political aspiration but an instrument to serve others? If Ethiopians are looking for a role model in Ethiopian politics, who do you think is such a role model or such role models? Can you be such a role model, if not now, but in the long run? I hope that these questions, among others, can help for personal reflections for those who are seeking leadership positions in politics. Also, those of us who are not seeking positions of leadership in politics can make our considered judgment as to who is truly in a proper political leadership position in Ethiopia for the right reasons and who is in such leadership positions for the wrong reasons.

Tedla Woldeyohannes has most recently taught philosophy at St. Louis University and Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Illinois and can reached at twoldeyo@slu.edu

What is the Beef between South Sudan and EPRDF?

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — South Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia is dismissing reports that relations are strained between the two countries after President Salva Kiir visited Egypt and met with President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi in Cairo earlier this month.

South Sudan’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union, James Pitia Morgan, made the remarks after some Ethiopian and South Sudanese media outlets reported that South Sudan and Egypt signed what they called a “dirty deal” to arm Ethiopian opposition groups based in South Sudan who aim to sabotage the big dam that Ethiopia is building on the Nile River.

Egypt has long felt that the massive dam Ethiopia is currently building will decrease its share of Nile waters, despite Ethiopia’s assurances that it won’t. This raised tensions between the two countries and the Ethiopian Prime Minister recently charged that “some elements within the Egyptian government” are supporting the unrest in his country.

Despite the tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt, South Sudan wants to have good relations with both, said Morgan.

Tewolde Mulugeta, spokesman for the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed with the ambassador’s remarks saying that South Sudan and Ethiopia enjoy good relations.

Ethiopia currently hosts close to 300,000 South Sudanese refugees, most of whom fled after conflict broke out in the world’s newest nation in December 2013, according to U.N estimates.

Copyright 2017 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Bill introduced to remove US from United Nations

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The proposed “American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2017” is sponsored by Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL). It was introduced in the House on Jan. 3 and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, according to the Congress website.

The bill proposes that the United States terminate its membership in the UN, that the UN removes its headquarters from the US, and that the US stops participating in the World Health Organization. Read the full bill here. 

Should it pass, the act would take effect two years after it is signed.

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Text: H.R.193 — 115th Congress (2017-2018)All Bill Information (Except Text)

There is one version of the bill.

Introduced in House (01/03/2017)

115th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 193

To end membership of the United States in the United Nations.


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 3, 2017

Mr. Rogers of Alabama (for himself, Mr. Jones, Mr. Biggs, Mr. Smith of Missouri, and Mr. Massie) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs


A BILL

To end membership of the United States in the United Nations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2017”.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945.

(a) Repeal.—The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 79–264; 22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is repealed.

(b) Termination Of Membership In United Nations.—The President shall terminate all membership by the United States in the United Nations, and in any organ, specialized agency, commission, or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations.

(c) Closure Of United States Mission To United Nations.—The United States Mission to the United Nations is closed. Any remaining functions of such office shall not be carried out.

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT ACT.

(a) Repeal.—The United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act (Public Law 80–357) is repealed.

(b) Withdrawal.—The United States withdraws from the agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations regarding the headquarters of the United Nations (signed at Lake Success, New York, on June 26, 1947, which was brought into effect by the United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act).

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

No funds are authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for assessed or voluntary contributions of the United States to the United Nations or to any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations, except that funds may be appropriated to facilitate termination of United States membership and withdrawal of United States personnel and equipment, in accordance with sections 2 and 3, respectively. Upon termination of United States membership, no payments shall be made to the United Nations or to any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations, out of any funds appropriated prior to such termination or out of any other funds available for such purposes.

SEC. 5. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

(a) Termination.—No funds are authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any United States contribution to any United Nations military or peacekeeping operation or force.

(b) Terminations Of United States Participation In United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.—No funds may be obligated or expended to support the participation of any member of the Armed Forces of the United States as part of any United Nations military or peacekeeping operation or force. No member of the Armed Forces of the United States may serve under the command of the United Nations.

SEC. 6. WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN FACILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPEAL OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY.

(a) Withdrawal From United States Government Property.—The United Nations (including any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations) may not occupy or use any property or facility of the United States Government.

(b) Diplomatic Immunity.—No officer or employee of the United Nations (including any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations) or any representative, officer, or employee of any mission to the United Nations of any foreign government shall be entitled to enjoy the privileges and immunities of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, nor may any such privileges and immunities be extended to any such individual. The privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for in the International Organizations Immunities Act of December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288 et seq.), or in any agreement or treaty to which the United States is a party, including the agreement entitled “Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations”, signed June 26, 1947 (22 U.S.C. 287 note), and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, entered into force with respect to the United States on April 29, 1970 (21 UST 1418; TIAS 6900; UNTS 16), shall not apply to the United Nations or to any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations, to the officers and employees of the United Nations, or of any organ, specialized agency, commission or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations, or to the families, suites, or servants of such officers or employees.

SEC. 7. REPEAL OF UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION.

The joint resolution entitled “A joint resolution providing for membership and participation by the United States in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and authorizing an appropriation therefor”, approved July 30, 1946 (Public Law 79–565, 22 U.S.C. 287m et seq.), is repealed.

SEC. 8. REPEAL OF UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1973.

The United Nations Environment Program Participation Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 287 note) is repealed.

SEC. 9. REPEAL OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

The joint resolution entitled “Joint Resolution providing for membership and participation by the United States in the World Health Organization and authorizing an appropriation therefor”, approved June 14, 1948 (22 U.S.C. 290), is repealed.

SEC. 10. REPEAL OF INVOLVEMENT IN UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS.

Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States will end any participation in any conventions and agreements with the United Nations and any organ, specialized agency, commission, or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations. Any remaining functions of such conventions and agreements shall not be carried out.

SEC. 11. REEMPLOYMENT WITH UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AFTER SERVICE WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the rights of employees under subchapter IV of chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, relating to reemployment after service with an international organization.

SEC. 12. NOTIFICATION.

Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall notify the United Nations and any organ, specialized agency, commission, or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations of the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 13. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Except as otherwise provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date that is two years after the date of the enactment of this Act.


CIA releases 13m pages of Secret documents online

 

UFO illustrationImage copyrightSCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY
Image captionThe documents include records of UFO sightings

About 13 million pages of declassified documents from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been released online.

The records include UFO sightings and psychic experiments from the Stargate programme, which has long been of interest to conspiracy theorists.

The move came after lengthy efforts from freedom of information advocates and a lawsuit against the CIA.

The full archive is made up of almost 800,000 files.

They had previously only been accessible at the National Archives in Maryland.

The trove includes the papers of Henry Kissinger, who served as secretary of state under presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, as well as several hundred thousand pages of intelligence analysis and science research and development.

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Among the more unusual records are documents from the Stargate Project, which dealt with psychic powers and extrasensory perception.

Those include records of testing on celebrity psychic Uri Geller in 1973, when he was already a well-established performer.

Memos detail how Mr Geller was able to partly replicate pictures drawn in another room with varying – but sometimes precise – accuracy, leading the researchers to write that he “demonstrated his paranormal perceptual ability in a convincing and unambiguous manner”.

JFK and the rise of conspiracy theories

Four-part composite showing a CIA researcher's drawings of a bunch of grapes and the solar system, left, and Uri Geller's very similar drawings, right.Image copyrightCIA
Image captionOne set of documents details results of psychic tests on Uri Geller, where he attempted to copy drawings made by researchers from within a sealed room

Other unusual records include a collection of reports on flying saucers, and the recipes for invisible ink.

While much of the information has been technically publicly available since the mid-1990s, it has been very difficult to access.

The records were only available on four physical computers located in the back of a library at the National Archives in Maryland, between 09:00 and 16:30 each day.

A document outlining recipes for Image copyrightCIA
Image captionRecipes for invisible ink

A non-profit freedom of information group, MuckRock, sued the CIA to force it to upload the collection, in a process which took more than two years.

At the same time, journalist Mike Best crowd-funded more than $15,000 to visit the archives to print out and then publicly upload the records, one by one, to apply pressure to the CIA.

“By printing out and scanning the documents at CIA expense, I was able to begin making them freely available to the public and to give the agency a financial incentive to simply put the database online,” Best wrote in a blog post.

In November, the CIA announced it would publish the material, and the entire declassified CREST archive is now available on the CIA Library website.

United States to Lift Sudan Sanctions

United Nations peacekeepers at a refugee camp in Sudan on Monday. In exchange for the lifting of United States trade sanctions, Sudan has said it will improve access for aid groups, stop supporting rebels in neighboring South Sudan and cooperate with American intelligence agents.

ASHRAF SHAZLY / AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE — GETTY IMAGES

By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN

LONDON — After nearly 20 years of hostile relations, the American government plans to reverse its position on Sudan and lift trade sanctions, Obama administration officials said late Thursday.

Sudan is one of the poorest, most isolated and most violent countries in Africa, and for years the United States has imposed punitive measures against it in a largely unsuccessful attempt to get the Sudanese government to stop killing its own people.

On Friday, the Obama administration will announce a new Sudan strategy. For the first time since the 1990s, the nation will be able to trade extensively with the United States, allowing it to buy goods like tractors and spare parts and attract much-needed investment in its collapsing economy.

In return, Sudan will improve access for aid groups, stop supporting rebels in neighboring South Sudan, cease the bombing of insurgent territory and cooperate with American intelligence agents.

American officials said Sudan had already shown important progress on a number of these fronts. But to make sure the progress continues, the executive order that President Obama plans to sign on Friday, days before leaving office, will have a six-month review period. If Sudan fails to live up to its commitments, the embargo can be reinstated.

Analysts said good relations with Sudan could strengthen moderate voices within the country and give the Sudanese government incentives to refrain from the brutal tactics that have defined it for decades.

In 1997, President Bill Clinton imposed a comprehensive trade embargo against Sudan and blocked the assets of the Sudanese government, which was suspected of sponsoring international terrorism. In the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden lived in Khartoum, the capital, as a guest of Sudan’s government.

In 1998, Bin Laden’s agents blew up the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 200 people. In retaliation, Mr. Clinton ordered a cruise missile strike against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum.

Since then, American-Sudanese relations have steadily soured. The conflict in Darfur, a vast desert region of western Sudan, was a low point. After rebels in Darfur staged an uprising in 2003, Sudanese security services and their militia allies slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians, leading to condemnation around the world, genocide charges at the International Criminal Court against Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, and a new round of American sanctions.

American officials said Thursday that the American demand that Mr. Bashir be held accountable had not changed. Neither has Sudan’s status as one of the few countries, along with Iran and Syria, that remain on the American government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Sales of military equipment will still be prohibited, and some Sudanese militia and rebel leaders will still face sanctions.

But the Obama administration is clearly trying to open a door to Sudan. There is intense discontent across the country, and its economy is imploding. American officials have argued for years that it was time to help Sudan dig itself out of the hole it had created.

Officials divulged Thursday that the Sudanese government had allowed two visits by American operatives to a restricted border area near Libya, which they cited as evidence of a new spirit of cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.

In addition to continuing violence in Darfur, several other serious conflicts are raging in southern and central Sudan, along with a civil war in newly independent South Sudan, which Sudan has been suspected of inflaming with covert arms shipments.

Eric Reeves, one of the leading American academic voices on Sudan, said he was “appalled” that the American government was lifting sanctions.

He said that Sudan’s military-dominated government continued to commit grave human rights abuses and atrocities, and he noted that just last week Sudanese security services killed more than 10 civilians in Darfur.

“There is no reason to believe the guys in charge have changed their stripes,” said Mr. Reeves, a senior fellow at the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University. “These guys are the worst of the worst.”

Obama administration officials said that they had briefed President-elect Donald J. Trump’s transition team, but that they did not know if Mr. Trump would stick with a policy of warmer relations with Sudan.

They said that Sudan had a long way to go in terms of respecting human rights, but that better relations could help increase American leverage.

Mr. Reeves said he thought that the American government was being manipulated and that the Obama administration had made a “deal with the devil.”

OMN – imperceptibly trafficking ‘Oromo issues’ might have applied same on Ethiopian forced migrants drowned in the Mediterranean

By Biraanu Gammachu

On 9th April 2016, Reuters reported, more than five hundred migrants; 15 from Ethiopian, 190 from Somalia, 80 from Egypt and 85 from Sudan have drowned as an overcrowded Ship ferrying them left Alexandria, Egypt heading to Greek capsized in Mediterranean ocean. Same year in similar incident tens and hundreds of migrants illegally on transit to Europe drown. It’s truly a horrible human disaster!  My prayer is with bereaved families and loved ones.

“If this Mass Sinking is not to be thoroughly investigated then three things will continue to happen. One, smugglers will continue to be richer. Second, Europe won’t put pressure on host country like Egypt in this case. Third, more people will drown”, BBC Newsnight reported.

Egyptian authorities, it sounds, have at least now picked interest in tracking and tracing how it – the Mediterranean human trafficking ring is centripitaling migrants from Somali, Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia, has kept enriching the traffickers. There should be a serious crackdown on the money-making cobweb.

In explaining why the migrants left their home country, it’s largely asserted; inobservance of, at least core, universal human rights principles,  and absence of viable democratic governance from their respective country of origin is listed as a major push-factor.

Ethiopia, much as it’s praised to have hosted almost a million refugees from neighboring countries like South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, annually it produces quite good number of refugees crossing Mediterranean.

Each time on a transit these unauthorized migrants from Ethiopia risk massive sinking in Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and a deadly desert corridor to a destination country – Europe and Middle East in most cases.

Some lucky ones have made through; others (simply many) are either have gone forever or ended up in wrong hands. But for many unregistered brokers – like human traffickers, it’s been a lucrative business. They say; one man’s problem is another man’s solution!

Oromo Media Network (OMN) while it has been trafficking Oromo issues, its branch manager in Cairo is reported to have involved in the Mediterranean Human Trafficking saga. BBC Newsnight reported, Muaz Mahmoud from Ethiopia, one of the victim survivors who lost his wife and two month old child, has narrated a very painful story of the tragic April 2016 shipwreck. Muaz implicated Nasibo Abdalla of Oromia Media Network Cairo branch who later on 1st January 2017 came under arrest in Cairo by Egyptian police. Egypt’s state sponsored investigation is underway and a conclusive report is yet to be made public. Here, an interesting question someone might ask is; ‘whether the said media organization is involved or not’.

Quite controversial with its management assembly, leadership disposition and its true intent; Oromia Media Network (OMN), is a television media outlet broadcasting ethnic Oromo’s exclusive social, political and economic perspective to Ethiopia. Down the road, irrefutably and for subtle end, the Diaspora based television is engaged on a serious business of fishing-out ‘Oromo community’ from its generic and natural setup – Ethiopia.

The rationale behind it sounds clear. The group like its program partner in charge of state power in Ethiopia does simply want to disrupt the age long line – Ethiopian National Identity, to which Oromo has been contributing its best to keep it more natural, vibrant and inclusive. It’s not a far-fetching fact that this media organization, then had slowly but surely involved in trafficking genuine Oromo issues unlinked with the people’s critical demand.

Ethiopia and Egypt are in a delicate relationship. In this heightened diplomatic rift one cannot rule out Egypt’s invisible hand on issues involving refugees from Ethiopia.

Egypt’s irrational Nile insecurity is standing toll than ever as Ethiopia’s retentive hydro-investment, if its self-induced ethnic challenges handled, is touching a probable momentum. But the establishment is no longer in the hands of Egypt; it’s not simply working out. From the backdoor, in order to ride the hydro-diplomacy drift in its favor, then Egypt has to remotely but expertly hold a trigger of an ethnic sling inside Ethiopia.

With its attached demographic, socioeconomic and geopolitical implications more than any other group ‘Oromo’s ethnocentric narrative’ graduates to be a soft target. That shouldn’t be taken for granted. Unlike some extreme leftist ethnic Oromo elites in the Diaspora who have been crafting an ‘ethnic identity’ as an anti-thesis to Ethiopian National Identity, back home substantial number of Ethiopians belonging to this sociolinguistic community are convincingly up to seeing Ethiopia where democratic principles are in full dispensation,  human rights are respected, electoral democracy is ensured and economic marginalization is addressed.

Behind all this mess lays Marxist-Leninist oriented Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led regime in Addis Ababa who ill-conceived and institutionalized ethnic politics in Ethiopia for the last 25 years.

Oromia Media Network (OMN) beyond its main subject – journalism, strategically bent on exploiting the Tigray First Ethiopia and the Nile Politics – then it ‘Loves Egypt’ more than it does ‘Ethiopia’. Either from Johannesburg or Cairo the love story will be live on its Arabic programming soon.

The writer can be reached at biraanug@gmail.com

 

Sisi With Kiir!

Egypt’s Sisi and South Sudan’s Kiir strike ‘dirty deal’

Egypt's Sisi and South Sudan's Kiir strike 'dirty deal'

The New Arab Egypt’s Sisi and South Sudan’s Kiir strike ‘dirty deal’

Kiir thanked Sisi and announced the implementation of a peace deal [Anadolu]

As Egypt continues to court Nile Basin countries, President Sisi met with South Sudan’s leader in Cairo amid ongoing fears about the future of a controversial Ethiopian dam project.

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir has met with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo to discuss strengthening ties between the two African nations.

Kiir thanked the Egyptian president on Tuesday for backing his government and said a peace deal signed to end his country’s civil war was alive and being implemented, Egyptian state media reported.

Kiir said he had rejected attempts by unnamed parties to renegotiate the August 2015 deal, adding that he and his number two – First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai – were working “very closely” together.

“We are implementing the agreement,” he said.

Taban in July replaced exiled opposition leader Riek Machar, who maintains that the deal has collapsed.

The visit comes weeks after Sisi visited Uganda to met meet with President Yoweri Museveni – a close ally of Kiir.

An unnamed source close to Machar’s rebel group told South Sudanese media that the meeting with Sisi was part of efforts to strike a “dirty deal”.

“There is a dirty deal going between Kiir and Sisi. The issue of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is one of the main deals being finalised in Cairo,” the source said.

He added that Egypt is keen to have South Sudan and Uganda as allies so that it can “advance its covert sabotage campaign against the Ethiopian Dam”.

Ethiopia is building the GERD hydropower dam on the Nile, close to its source in the Ethiopian highlands. It has raised fears in Egypt, which depends on controlling the flow of the Nile for its agriculture, industry and domestic water supplies.

Saudi Arabian officials recently visited the controversial dam in Ethiopia, dealing a fresh blow to already strained tensions between Cairo and Riyadh.

Sisi has also met with his Eritrean counterpart Isaias Afwerki in Cairo in a discussion that was described as a “deliberate move” against Ethiopia, political sources told The New Arab at the time.

Aljazeera’s point of View and the Gondar Protests

An analysis on what the rising ethnic nationalism among the historically powerful Amhara means for the country’s future.

A man from Ethiopia’s Amhara, the second largest ethnic group in the country [ K Muller/De Agostini/Getty Images]
By 

Amba Giorgis, Ethiopia – Etenesh* sits alone on a worn cow skin in her mud-walled home in Amba Giorgis, a small Ethiopian market town in the northerly Amhara region. Her husband, a merchant, was arrested early in November, due to his alleged participation in anti-government protests over the last few months.

“He was taken to a military camp,” says Etenesh, a mother of two who sells coffee to farmers from her shack. “I know that because he called me twice.”

She does not know when, or if, he will come back, but she does know that life without the family’s primary breadwinner is tough. “It’s just me now, trying to provide for my kids.”

Talk of arrests is prevalent in Amba Giorgis, which is part of the North Gondar district experiencing clashes between armed farmers and the military.

On the edge of town, government soldiers man a new checkpoint. They moved into a road construction camp, following the declaration of a sweeping state of emergency on October 8 in response to the unrest among Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups: the Oromo, who make up around one-third of the population, and the Amhara.

On July 31, residents of Gondar, which is around 700km north of the capital, Addis Ababa, came out to demonstrate amid a long-standing territorial dispute with the neighbouring Tigray region. During Ethiopia’s transition from a unitary to a federal state in the early 1990s, some Amhara claim they lost territory to Tigrayans when the country was restructured along ethnolinguistic lines.

The demonstrations have been used as a platform to voice discontent over alleged government repression of the Amhara as well as to promote a budding ethnic nationalism among them. The Amhara are the second-largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, constituting 27 percent in the country of nearly 100 million people.

The ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is a grouping of four ethnic-based parties, including Oromo, Amhara and Tigray parties. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front ( TPLF), is the founder of the EPRDF and is perceived to be the powerhouse  of the coalition, even though Tigrayans represent just six percent of the population.

Pro-TPLF  commentators believe that the Amhara wing of the coalition, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, gave its blessing to the Gondar protest as part of an attempt to reduce TPLF dominance. But events gathered momentum, when the sentiments on display in Gondar reverberated in the following weeks, as thousands of ethnic Amhara hit the streets in towns like Amba Giorgis.

During the protests, slogans reflected a sense of victimisation.

“Being an Amhara is not a crime,” read one. “Respect Amharaness,” said another.

Properties associated with the ruling coalition were attacked, and the main road leading to the tourist-magnet Simien Mountains was blockaded.

The government’s emergency decree, which, among other things, bans most political activity, including watching opposition satellite channels, has seen tens of thousands detained on suspicion of being party to the unrest.

“Some 11,607 individuals have so far been detained in six prisons, of which 347 are female, in connection with the state of emergency declared in the country,” official Taddesse Hordofa said in a televised statement on November 12 after the state of emergency was implemented.

The measure has returned a degree of order to Ethiopia. However, underlying issues remain.

Amba Giorgis, in North Gondar, in Amhara region, has seen increased demonstrations and a rise in nationalist identity [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

Split identity

The Amhara held privileged positions during the imperial era that ended with Emperor Haile Selassie’s overthrow in 1974. Some EPRDF’s federalists insist that they remain loyal to ideas from that time and are suspicious of the current arrangement.

For hundreds of years, the language and culture of Ethiopia’s imperial courts was Amharic and, for many, advancement in career or social status depended on assimilating to it and many ambitious members of other ethnicities adopted Amhara customs.

By the 20th century, the Amhara culture had become the culture of the educated and of urban “elites” who were often ethnically mixed, according to the historian, Takkle Taddese. As a result, the Amhara can be seen as “a supra ethnically conscious ethnic Ethiopian serving as the pot in which all the other ethnic groups are supposed to melt,” writes Taddese in his essay, titled: Do the Amharas Exist as a Distinct Ethnic Group?

When the EPRDF came to power in 1991 and ushered in federalism, the Amhara were treated just as any other ethnic group: a collection of people with their own identity and territory – a premise with which proponents of contemporary Amhara nationalism agree.

The Amhara have existed as a distinct community for thousands of years, fulfilling “all the basic markers of an ethnic group: distinct language, distinct culture, collective national memory and experience and so forth”, argues Wondwosen Tafesse, an academic based in Norway and a commentator on Amhara issues.

But even with surging ethnic assertiveness, many Amhara are still likely to give precedence to pan-Ethiopian identity, as Amhara nationalism is not an end in itself, according to Wondwosen.

Rather, it is a reaction to “fend off multiple attacks, real and imagined”, he says. The expulsion in 2013 of thousands of Amharas by regional officials from Southern People’s Regional State and Benishangul-Gumuz , according to a report by The Human Rights Congress of Ethiopia, is raised to support allegations that the government deliberatelytargets ethnic Amharas.

For opposing Amhara elites, who had to grapple with the pre-eminent questions of identity during EPRDF rule, ethnic

An unknown future

Even with a growing sense of ethnic nationalism, pan-Ethiopian nationalism still enjoys wider acceptance among the Amhara elites, argues Chalachew Taddese, a contributor for Wazema, a non-profit radio station founded by exiled Ethiopian journalists based in Europe and the United States. Amhara nationalists, therefore, have to tackle those who see an excessive ethnic focus as compromising the nation’s integrity.

Taddese says two factors have contributed to the increase in Amhara identity: “A growing perception of ethnic discrimination” by the government and “persistent anti-Amhara campaigns” by Oromo elites, who portray the group as “a historical coloniser and victimiser of all other ethnic groups”.

If Amhara nationalism grows in prominence, the relationship with Oromo nationalism might be decisive for the country’s future.

The market town Amba Giorgis, in the North Gondar region, where farmers have been clashing with the military in nearby areas recently [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

During the protests, Oromo and Amhara nationalists displayed signs of solidarity in the face of what they believed to be a common enemy: the TPLF. But, there were always questions   about the camaraderie and whether it was meaningful and sustainable.

The Oromo rose up in November 2015 amid complaints that they have been politically and economically marginalised under a federal system that promised them autonomy. The protests were a testament to a reinvigorated Oromo nationalism.

Unlike its nascent Amhara equivalent, Oromo nationalism goes back a half-century, with an established ideology, institutions and aspirations.

Any secessionist Oromo tendencies cause alarm among Amharas, who promote their identity within a multinational Ethiopia.

But Oromo nationalism is also predicated upon alleged persecution by Amhara elites during the imperial era. Accordingly, Amhara nationalism, if it solidifies, “will be forced to counteract the narratives of Oromo elites”, Chalachew says.

One battleground will be the legacy of Menelik II, a late 19th-century emperor whose military campaigns shaped the boundaries of modern Ethiopia. Oromo nationalists, who want to remove his statue in the heart of Addis Ababa, see him as an Amhara imperialist conqueror.

Amid these immediate and pressing challenges, the rise in Amhara nationalism creates more turbulence in the region, raising questions that no one yet seems able to answer.

A section of the royal castle compound in Gondar. The city’s history as a power centre is playing into recent ethnic-related unrest [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

*Names has been changed for privacy purposes.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Aljazeera’s point of View and the Gondar Protests

An analysis on what the rising ethnic nationalism among the historically powerful Amhara means for the country’s future.

A man from Ethiopia’s Amhara, the second largest ethnic group in the country [ K Muller/De Agostini/Getty Images]
By 

Amba Giorgis, Ethiopia – Etenesh* sits alone on a worn cow skin in her mud-walled home in Amba Giorgis, a small Ethiopian market town in the northerly Amhara region. Her husband, a merchant, was arrested early in November, due to his alleged participation in anti-government protests over the last few months.

“He was taken to a military camp,” says Etenesh, a mother of two who sells coffee to farmers from her shack. “I know that because he called me twice.”

She does not know when, or if, he will come back, but she does know that life without the family’s primary breadwinner is tough. “It’s just me now, trying to provide for my kids.”

Talk of arrests is prevalent in Amba Giorgis, which is part of the North Gondar district experiencing clashes between armed farmers and the military.

On the edge of town, government soldiers man a new checkpoint. They moved into a road construction camp, following the declaration of a sweeping state of emergency on October 8 in response to the unrest among Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups: the Oromo, who make up around one-third of the population, and the Amhara.

On July 31, residents of Gondar, which is around 700km north of the capital, Addis Ababa, came out to demonstrate amid a long-standing territorial dispute with the neighbouring Tigray region. During Ethiopia’s transition from a unitary to a federal state in the early 1990s, some Amhara claim they lost territory to Tigrayans when the country was restructured along ethnolinguistic lines.

The demonstrations have been used as a platform to voice discontent over alleged government repression of the Amhara as well as to promote a budding ethnic nationalism among them. The Amhara are the second-largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, constituting 27 percent in the country of nearly 100 million people.

The ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is a grouping of four ethnic-based parties, including Oromo, Amhara and Tigray parties. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front ( TPLF), is the founder of the EPRDF and is perceived to be the powerhouse  of the coalition, even though Tigrayans represent just six percent of the population.

Pro-TPLF  commentators believe that the Amhara wing of the coalition, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, gave its blessing to the Gondar protest as part of an attempt to reduce TPLF dominance. But events gathered momentum, when the sentiments on display in Gondar reverberated in the following weeks, as thousands of ethnic Amhara hit the streets in towns like Amba Giorgis.

During the protests, slogans reflected a sense of victimisation.

“Being an Amhara is not a crime,” read one. “Respect Amharaness,” said another.

Properties associated with the ruling coalition were attacked, and the main road leading to the tourist-magnet Simien Mountains was blockaded.

The government’s emergency decree, which, among other things, bans most political activity, including watching opposition satellite channels, has seen tens of thousands detained on suspicion of being party to the unrest.

“Some 11,607 individuals have so far been detained in six prisons, of which 347 are female, in connection with the state of emergency declared in the country,” official Taddesse Hordofa said in a televised statement on November 12 after the state of emergency was implemented.

The measure has returned a degree of order to Ethiopia. However, underlying issues remain.

Amba Giorgis, in North Gondar, in Amhara region, has seen increased demonstrations and a rise in nationalist identity [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

Split identity

The Amhara held privileged positions during the imperial era that ended with Emperor Haile Selassie’s overthrow in 1974. Some EPRDF’s federalists insist that they remain loyal to ideas from that time and are suspicious of the current arrangement.

For hundreds of years, the language and culture of Ethiopia’s imperial courts was Amharic and, for many, advancement in career or social status depended on assimilating to it and many ambitious members of other ethnicities adopted Amhara customs.

By the 20th century, the Amhara culture had become the culture of the educated and of urban “elites” who were often ethnically mixed, according to the historian, Takkle Taddese. As a result, the Amhara can be seen as “a supra ethnically conscious ethnic Ethiopian serving as the pot in which all the other ethnic groups are supposed to melt,” writes Taddese in his essay, titled: Do the Amharas Exist as a Distinct Ethnic Group?

When the EPRDF came to power in 1991 and ushered in federalism, the Amhara were treated just as any other ethnic group: a collection of people with their own identity and territory – a premise with which proponents of contemporary Amhara nationalism agree.

The Amhara have existed as a distinct community for thousands of years, fulfilling “all the basic markers of an ethnic group: distinct language, distinct culture, collective national memory and experience and so forth”, argues Wondwosen Tafesse, an academic based in Norway and a commentator on Amhara issues.

But even with surging ethnic assertiveness, many Amhara are still likely to give precedence to pan-Ethiopian identity, as Amhara nationalism is not an end in itself, according to Wondwosen.

Rather, it is a reaction to “fend off multiple attacks, real and imagined”, he says. The expulsion in 2013 of thousands of Amharas by regional officials from Southern People’s Regional State and Benishangul-Gumuz , according to a report by The Human Rights Congress of Ethiopia, is raised to support allegations that the government deliberatelytargets ethnic Amharas.

For opposing Amhara elites, who had to grapple with the pre-eminent questions of identity during EPRDF rule, ethnic

An unknown future

Even with a growing sense of ethnic nationalism, pan-Ethiopian nationalism still enjoys wider acceptance among the Amhara elites, argues Chalachew Taddese, a contributor for Wazema, a non-profit radio station founded by exiled Ethiopian journalists based in Europe and the United States. Amhara nationalists, therefore, have to tackle those who see an excessive ethnic focus as compromising the nation’s integrity.

Taddese says two factors have contributed to the increase in Amhara identity: “A growing perception of ethnic discrimination” by the government and “persistent anti-Amhara campaigns” by Oromo elites, who portray the group as “a historical coloniser and victimiser of all other ethnic groups”.

If Amhara nationalism grows in prominence, the relationship with Oromo nationalism might be decisive for the country’s future.

The market town Amba Giorgis, in the North Gondar region, where farmers have been clashing with the military in nearby areas recently [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

During the protests, Oromo and Amhara nationalists displayed signs of solidarity in the face of what they believed to be a common enemy: the TPLF. But, there were always questions   about the camaraderie and whether it was meaningful and sustainable.

The Oromo rose up in November 2015 amid complaints that they have been politically and economically marginalised under a federal system that promised them autonomy. The protests were a testament to a reinvigorated Oromo nationalism.

Unlike its nascent Amhara equivalent, Oromo nationalism goes back a half-century, with an established ideology, institutions and aspirations.

Any secessionist Oromo tendencies cause alarm among Amharas, who promote their identity within a multinational Ethiopia.

But Oromo nationalism is also predicated upon alleged persecution by Amhara elites during the imperial era. Accordingly, Amhara nationalism, if it solidifies, “will be forced to counteract the narratives of Oromo elites”, Chalachew says.

One battleground will be the legacy of Menelik II, a late 19th-century emperor whose military campaigns shaped the boundaries of modern Ethiopia. Oromo nationalists, who want to remove his statue in the heart of Addis Ababa, see him as an Amhara imperialist conqueror.

Amid these immediate and pressing challenges, the rise in Amhara nationalism creates more turbulence in the region, raising questions that no one yet seems able to answer.

A section of the royal castle compound in Gondar. The city’s history as a power centre is playing into recent ethnic-related unrest [William Davison/Al Jazeera]

*Names has been changed for privacy purposes.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.